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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The ability of computers to remember so well for so long 
undercuts the human frailty that assists privacy”1
 
In January 2001, a study2 conducted at the initiative of the European 
Commission was pointing out that “Europe has not yet experienced an acute outbreak of 
unsolicited commercial communications or spam”. Only 3 years later, the Commission 
itself was calling attention to the fact that “spam has reached worrying proportions”3, 
arguably justifying the enactment of a special legal framework aimed at bringing this 
phenomenon to a halt. 
Essentially, the purpose of most spamming is the commercial marketing 
activity, although the content of spam e-mails can vary, including sometimes malicious 
applications (like viruses) and different types of financial schemes. At the same time, this 
activity involves a personal data processing, as it needs, as an absolute prerequisite, the 
collection and use of e-mail addresses4. Thus, spamming is potentially directed 
indiscriminately towards each and every individual that owns one such address.  
In my view, spam is to be viewed as an anomaly, both from the perspectives of 
commercial practice and data processing. As I will argue all throughout this thesis, the e-
mail addresses can be considered in the overwhelming majority of cases (even when they 
                                                 
1 James H.Moor  “Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age”, article in “ Computer Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility”  ed. Terrell Ward Bynum & Simon Rogerson, Blackwell Publishing 2004 
2 Commission of the European Communities: “Unsolicited Commercial Communications and Data 
Protection” (Internal Market DG – Contract n° ETD/99/B5-3000/E/96), January 2001, authors Serge 
Gauthronet and Etienne Drouard. 
3 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee of the Regions on unsolicited commercial communications or ‘spam’”, Brussels, 
22.01.2004, COM (2004) 28 final. 
4 Although spam can be distributed also through sms messages, facsimile machines and automated calling 
machines, due to the limited size of this thesis I will limit my analysis to e-mail spam messages. 
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belong to legal persons) as personal data5. Therefore, the collection, use and third party 
disclosure of the e-mail addresses carried out as part of the spam activities represent not 
only commercial practices, but can be seen also as involving a processing6 of personal 
data.  While as a rule, personal data has to be collected and processed “fairly and 
lawfully” and while e-mail marketing is a legitimate business with a series of 
unquestionable advantages both for the marketer and the prospect customer, as an 
exception, the spamming activity speculates on existing legal, technical or enforcement 
difficulties in order to reach the expected commercial benefits while short-circuiting the 
established rules7.   
The scope of the analysis carried out in this thesis will be limited to the relevant 
material provisions in the European legislation, provisions that are supposed to represent 
the legislative tools available to the Member States in the fight against spam. I will not 
address therefore the procedural and enforcement challenges faced by the Member States 
in implementing and in making use of these tools. Such a broad analysis is presently 
conducted by international bodies such as ITU8, OECD9, or WGIG10. On the other hand, 
the research I carried out for the purpose of this thesis revealed the lack of a thorough 
legal analysis of the material provisions that the Member States are required to 
implement as a sign of their commitment to the fight against spam. While these  legal 
provisions have been explained, dissected, reinterpreted at both European11 and national 
level12, few if any studies that I was able to access have questioned the balance of 
interests achieved by enacting them, the way in which they respond to existing business 
                                                 
5 in the interpretation given to the term “personal data” by the article 2(a) of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
6 in the interpretation given to the term “ processing” by the article 2(b) of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
7 These rules pertaining both to the e-commerce framework and to  the privacy and data protection  
8 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/ (last visited: 30 August 2005). 
9 http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_22555297_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited: 30 August 
2005). 
10 “Background Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance” (June 2005), available at: 
http://www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc.  
11 see for example: COM (2004) 28 final, COM (2003) 702 final, “Opinion 5/2004 on unsolicited 
communications for marketing purposes under article 13 of Directive 2002/58/EC”, 11601/EN WP90.  
12 see for example, UK Information Commissioner: “Guidance to the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003”, available at: 
http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/Electronic%20Communications%20
Part%201%20Version%203.pdf, and also “FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy – Belgium « 
Spamming » 24 questions & answers” – January 2005 available at: 
http://mineco.fgov.be/information_society/spamming/spamming_note_en.pdf. 
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realities, their integration in the legal context to which they belong or their relative 
dynamics.  
It is in these particular aspects that my present work aims at contributing to the 
existing doctrine examining the normative response to spam. It will focus mainly on the 
European Union framework, although references to non-European solutions will be also 
made, for comparison purposes. 
The contextualisation of the spam anomaly will have as a basis the two facets of 
this phenomenon: the commercial one and the privacy and personal data processing one. 
Therefore, the thesis will consider three basic elements: the spam practices, the values 
and interests of the actors involved in spam (marketers and end-users) and the way in 
which these two elements are reflected and responded to in the current normative anti-
spam framework.  
One last preliminary comment needs to be made relating to the titles chosen for 
the first two sections of the third chapter. I am fully aware that the community law cannot 
be split into “e-commerce related legislation” and “privacy and data protection 
legislation”, as it is a whole body of legal norms aiming to establish rules applicable to all 
the facets of a complex reality (the Internal Market) and thus being intermingled and 
containing cross references. However, I chose to make this artificial distinction only to 
enhance the two facets of the topic I’m dealing with. Spam is most often an advertising 
tactic, that is a business related practice and at the same time an intrusion in the privacy 
of the natural person receiving it, involving often a processing of personal data (the e-
mail address). Since the third section of Chapter 3 will evaluate the overall efficiency of 
the anti-spam provisions in the European legislation, the initial unity will hopefully be re-
established. 
Although most of the average computer users could recognise a spam message 
when they receive one in their e-mail box, very few of them might accept the challenge to 
define or to explain it. As for examples, lots of them could be provided. Their dilemma is 
perfectly excusable, as there is, up until this moment, no universally agreed definition of 
spam, although more and more international initiatives and action plans to combat it are 
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launched13 . The various definitions provided are more functional and working 
definitions. Moreover, although the Community legislation refrains from using the term 
spam as it is, other official documents use it14.  
 
It is important for the purpose of this thesis to identify clear definitions that 
would enable me to distinguish between the e-mail spam and the e-mail marketing (even 
the one involving some unsolicited commercial communications) on the one hand, and 
between the legal ways of collecting and processing personal data and the practices 
involved in spam. With this aspect in mind, I will use all throughout this thesis the 
interpretation given by the OECD to the term “spam”15, although references to other 
definitions will be provided also. The OECD identified a series of characteristics 
(primary and secondary traits) that can be associated with spam. Those characteristics 
pertain to: 
a) the way in which the e-mail addresses were collected ( as spammers use 
addresses that were collected or sold without the user’s consent, either electronically 
harvested from public sources- web pages or newsgroups, or sold without the consent of 
the individual to third parties, or guessed with a specially designed software )  
b) the transmission practices (as these messages are sent electronically, in 
large quantities(bulk), by an anonymous or disguised sender, are repetitive, untargeted 
and indiscriminate as to the potential receiver ) 
c)  the content of the e-mail messages sent by the spammer ( usually a 
commercial related content, although they could have political theme, contain viruses or 
illegal and harmful content. ) 
                                                 
13 see for example  http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_22555297_1_1_1_1_1,00.html for 
the OECD work on spam and also http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/ for the International 
Telecommunication Union activities in combating spam ( last visited July 16th 2005) 
14 see for example; the Presidency Paper, “Unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes or 
spam”, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 24 November 2004, 15148/04,  Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party’s “Working Document Privacy on the Internet - An integrated EU Approach  to 
On-line Data Protection-” 21st November 2000, 5063/00/EN/FINAL WP 37 
15 “Background paper for the OECD workshop on spam”, DSTI/ICCP( 2003)10/FINAL, 2003, page 7 
available at  
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/edfc2255d6a8a51ac1256
e240030f5b6/$FILE/JT00157096.PDF ( last visited July 16th 2005) 
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d) the position of the receiver with regard to the spam message (for the 
receiver, the e-mail spam message is unwanted, unsolicited, unstoppable, as the 
unsubscribe links do not work ). 
All the traits identified above will serve as comparison items in the first two 
chapters of the thesis. 
I should also state that the characterisation provided above is more narrow than 
the one available in the official EU Documents, thus comprising a more limited range of 
behaviours. Take for example the following definitions: Spam is “the practice of sending 
unsolicited e-mails, usually of a commercial nature, in large numbers and repeatedly to 
individuals with whom the sender has had no previous contact”16. Other definitions point 
out apart from the unsolicited and the commercial character some other different features 
commonly associated with spam: the fact that the “e-mail address has been collected in a 
public space on the Internet”17or that the sender disguises or forges his identity”18. 
Finally, a more recent view of the European Commission, after the opt-in regime for 
unsolicited commercial e-mail messages was introduced by the Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications19 , states that “in short, [spam] is commonly used to describe 
unsolicited, often bulk e-mails. The new Directive does not define or use the term ‘spam’. 
It uses the concepts of ‘unsolicited communications’ by ‘electronic mail’, ‘for the 
purposes of direct marketing’ which taken together, will in effect cover most sorts of 
‘spam’. Therefore, the concept of ‘spam’ is used in this Communication as a shortcut for 
unsolicited commercial electronic mail”20  
As it can be seen from these definitions, the most common traits of the practice 
that I aim at analyzing refer to the commercial character, to some circumstances 
involving the collection of the e-mail address and to the fake identity of the sender. While 
these are essential traits, they are only detailed in the national legislations implementing 
                                                 
16 DPWP: “Privacy on the Internet (2000), 5063/00/EN/FINAL. 
17 DPWP “Opinion 1/2000 on certain data protection aspects of electronic commerce”(5007/00/EN/final) , 
page 3  http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2000/wp28_en.pdf (last visited 
July 16th 2005) 
18 Serge Gauthronet and Etienne Drouard (2001), op.cit 
19 “Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector”, Official 
Journal  L 201, 31/07/2002, P. 0037- 0047  
20 COM(2004) 28 final, op.cit. 
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the Directive with little guidance as to the distinction between spam and e-mail 
marketing.  
The other term of the comparison, “direct marketing” is commonly agreed as 
designating  “the communication by whatever means (including but not limited to mail, 
fax, telephone, on-line services etc…) of any advertising or marketing material, which is 
carried out by the Direct Marketer itself or on its behalf and which is directed to 
particular individuals”21. By examining this, as well as other very broad definitions for 
the same concept22, it can be noticed that no references to the “etiquette” of the 
advertising messages is being made, which in itself explains the fuzziness of the dividing 
line between the e-mail marketing involving also unsolicited commercial 
communications  and spam. By using the comparative method described above, I will try 
to separate more clearly the two concepts. 
The thesis is, for obvious reasons, limited as regards the technical and practical 
aspects of spam. Although I will make references to legal texts, codes of conducts and 
guidelines,  I am conscious that there is a difference between stated principles and 
business practices, and that the marketer’s day to day practice will seldom be “black or 
white” in terms of the conformity to the stated rules. 
                                                 
21 FEDMA (2005), available at: 
 http://www.fedma.org/img/db/PressPackJan2005.pdf ( last visited  July 28, 2005). 
22 see for example the definition in the  ICC International Code of Direct Marketing, 1998: “direct 
marketing comprises all communication activities with the intention of offering goods or services or 
transmitting commercial messages presented in any medium aimed at informing and/or soliciting a 
response from the addressee, as well as any service directly related thereto. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 Spamming as an advertising practice 
  
 
 
 
Sat, 02 Jul 2005 20:12:51 +0500 
From: 
"Clifton Baker" <sotebdwuyec@hotmail.com>  Add to 
Address Book
To:  dancogs2@yahoo.com 
Subject: re [16] 
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Section 1: The role of personal information in the advertising practice 
today 
 
 
Once the technological advances are employed “in the interest” of the 
individuals, inevitably they will reshape the way in which people organise their daily 
lives, the way they perceive themselves and their needs and the way in which they do 
business with each other. “As the most disruptive technological change since 
electricity”23, the digital revolution caused significant changes, especially in the market 
for individual goods, challenging the traditional dichotomy between goods and services 
and allowing the trade of a larger category of items through a variety of mediums . 
One of these changes relates to the dual impact of the digital technologies on the 
individual’s ability to maintain control over the environment in which he lives: while 
expanding the choices available and bringing diversity in both products and lifestyles, 
through enabling at the same time the acquisition, retention and secondary dissemination 
of vast amounts of data, the digital technologies allow the individual to a lesser extent to 
exercise informational self-determination, making him no longer able to assert with 
certainty what information about him is available and who controls it, much less how it 
got out of the private sphere into the public domain. 
From the marketers’ point of view, personal data24 regarding both the off –line 
identity of a potential client( credit card number, name, physical address) and the on-line 
identity of the same customer( e-mail address, individual tastes and browsing patterns, 
purchasing history ) represent both an asset25 and a commodity26 in itself.  
                                                 
23 Paul H Rubin and Thomas M. Lenard, “Privacy and the commercial use of personal  information” 
,Kluver Academic Publishing, 2001, page 18 
24 According to the FEDMA European code of practice for the use of personal data in direct marketing, the 
term “personal data” used by direct marketers has the same meaning as the one consecrated by article 2(a) 
of the Directive 95/46/EC: “Personal Data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person. An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” (see page 3 of the Code) 
25 http://www.answers.com/asset&r=67 an “asset” represents a resource that an individual, corporation, or 
country owns or controls that has economic value and that is expected to provide future benefit  
26 http://www.answers.com/commodity  a commodity (business meaning of the term) is an undifferentiated 
product whose market value arises from the owner's right to sell rather than the right to use. Example 
commodities from the financial world include oil (sold by the barrel), electricity, wheat, bulk chemicals. 
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 Subsection 1: Personal data as an asset. 
Data on individuals has been used by marketers long before the advent of 
Internet. The advertising campaigns had to take into account the characteristics of the 
targeted group, such as demographic structure, consumer group, trends in buying as well 
as manifested interests or hobbies, in order to increase their positive response rate. While 
the consumers have been accustomed with providing customer data, that can be used for 
these types of profiling, but that, at the same time cannot be traced back to their source 
enough to make the respondents identifiable, the increase in the personal data exchanges 
occurring through the Internet raised awareness among consumers worried that their 
privacy is being threatened. Whether this concern is justified or not, deserves a much 
larger analysis; what is important in this context, since I initially qualified spam as an 
anomaly, is to be able to draw the line between legitimate commercial activities involving 
the use of personal information for direct marketing purposes and the illegal and 
illegitimate use of personal information in the context of spam.  
We can consider personal data is an ASSET for advertisers by examining the 
two features comprised in the definition of the term: economic value and the ability to 
provide future benefits:  
1.  The economic value of the personal information. While traditional media 
of dissemination of advertising messages is more rigid as regards the adaptability of the 
content to the profile of a certain group or individual, marketing techniques used by the 
advertisers today allow them to target the advertising campaigns to smaller groups of 
people, based on customers’ interests, as identified or inferred previously by the marketer 
through examining on-line activities. On the Internet, targeted advertising is 
accomplished by developing an understanding about the possible customer’s interests and 
then matching and delivering relevant advertisements. As Rubin and Lenard (2001)27 
have shown, advertisers compile individual’s web-browsing activities and apply database 
technologies and statistical models that yield demographic and interest profiles. 
Advertisements relevant to consumers’ profiles are then inserted in the web pages they 
visit and website operators receive advertising revenues based on pages viewed and 
                                                 
27 Paul H Rubin and Thomas M. Lenard, op.cit, page 8 
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advertisements delivered. Targeted advertising is therefore made possible by the use of 
personal information. Marketers are interested in the efficient allocation of their 
resources, and this implies not spending on advertising products or services that either is 
not of interest to a particular consumer group, or the commercial communication is not 
suited to appeal their level of understanding and interest.  
Two processes should be distinguished here:  
a) on the one hand is the collection and use of personal data in order to compile 
aggregated profiles that permit the identification of a particular set of characteristics that 
make a group desirable to a marketer. In this case, what is of interest is not the identity of 
one particular person( What kind of car can I sell to John  Smith ?) but the possibility to 
determine clusters of consumers “ more likely than average to want a new car”. Data is 
widely available, being compiled by credit reporting agencies (data pertaining to name, 
social security number, address, telephone numbers, date of birth, a detailed credit and 
payment history plus information available from public records), companies (data 
aggregators) engaged in the collection, processing and reselling of information from all 
possible registries, as well as data collected through cookies, pertaining to one’s on-line 
behaviour ( sites visited, number of times, click –through, products bought on-line, e-
shops visited)28.  Some companies distinguish between data collected through opt-in 
procedures, and data collected through opt-out, with the first category being more 
expensive.  It is then stored on servers, and “not known” individually by any human  that 
only get to perceive the end-result of this process, clusters with common features, more 
likely to be interested in a certain product or service( this does not exclude the possibility 
to trace back and match data from different sources in order to compile an individual 
profile).  
Once the raw information is gathered, it can “be used multiple times at a low 
marginal cost without any decrease in its value”. As the authors quoted point out29,  
“Advertisers, credit institutions and insurance companies all use the 
same commercial information because all find it valuable. Since the 
                                                 
28 this information is mainly linked to the browsing patterns of a certain computer, but it is assumed there is 
an individual ( or more people using the same computer) that uses it. 
29 Paul H Rubin and Thomas M. Lenard, op.cit., page 9 
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various uses of information subsidise each other, more information is 
collected and the cost to each of the users is reduced” 
b) on the other hand, personal data is being collected as to enable the direct 
marketing of the “custom made advertisements”; this personal data pertains to the 
address, the telephone number or the e-mail address of the targeted customers, depending 
on the medium chosen for the dissemination of the advertising communications. 
Although it has been argued this sort of data is publicly available in directories, so it can 
be used without any limitations30, there are solid grounds31 to protect their owners by 
unsolicited intrusions.  
 
2. The ability to provide future benefits. One of the benefits in gathering as 
much information as possible about prospective customers has been pointed out already: 
in the short run, targeted advertising made possible by the use of personal information 
increases the positive response rate of the customers (increases their willingness to buy 
the company’s products and services), hence the increase in the company’s revenues.  
The costs of a direct marketing campaign through e-mail, automated calling 
machines, sms, facsimile are much smaller then those involved in indirect marketing 
techniques, through television, radio, brochures. The reduced costs come first of all from 
the fact that the companies do not actually pay to get the personal information from the 
customers (they still sell their products and services to the customers for the price they 
set), but consider somehow it’s their right to use it once it was made available. On the 
other hand, there are no intermediary costs involved in the printing, distribution, mailing 
of the commercial messages, which can reach the potential customers directly. At the 
same time, the marketers have the benefit of being provided instantly with the feedback 
of their activity, once the members of the target group chosen either decide to buy or to 
discard the commercial messages received.  
                                                 
30 according to David Silver, a direct marketer who uses spam, “If I look up a phone number in the White 
Pages, I have the right to call that number because it’s public information. So is the E-mail address that’s 
posted anywhere on the ’net. If I had to break in with a password to get that address, that would be illegal. 
But what I do is the same as opening the phone book. If someone doesn’t want bulk E-mail, they shouldn’t 
place their address anywhere that’s publicly accessible” (the interview was published by L. Goff. “A Line 
in the SPAM”. Computerworld, 88–89, August, 1997 and quoted by R.A. Spinello in “Ethical reflections 
on the problem of spam” article in Ethics and Information Technology 1: 185–191, 1999 ) 
31 as it will be shown further in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis 
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In the longer term the company will be able to optimize its distribution or 
resources and achieve economic efficiency and a bigger market share.  
Moreover, some businesses, such as Yahoo, Google,  use funds resulted from 
advertising to support and finance services that are free for the customers (such as free e-
mail), the company will get the possibility to advertise its products and services to a 
larger group of people and also to collect more personal information from them. 
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 Subsection 2: Personal data as commodity 
What defines personal data as commodity is the fact that its market value arises 
not only from the right to use it but even more from trading it.  Companies engaged in the 
collection, processing and storage of data pertaining to individuals rent these lists and 
perform various kinds of analysis for customers, thus enabling them to develop both 
traditional and web based direct marketing campaigns. Due to the multiplicity of uses that 
personal information has, it has become profitable to engage in the collection, storage, 
and reselling of personal information. Still, while it is clearly in the advantage of 
business, the reselling and re-aggregation of personal information from different sources 
has not been backed up by allowing the individual to control and to rectify the 
information about him that can be found somewhere on a Internet server, as it is the case 
with other processing of personal data. Ann Cavoukian suggested32 that:  
“While personal information has been commodified or 
commercialized, there has not been a corresponding empowerment 
of individuals that would give them the ability to control how their 
personal information will be used, or for which they will be 
compensated. Companies can now freely collect, use or disclose 
personal information without having to pay any compensation…” 
This opinion cannot be accepted without reserves. The commodification of the 
information has been accompanied, in Europe at least, by enacting legislation aimed at 
protecting the interests of the consumers. However, empirical studies33 show the low 
level of awareness among individuals about the appropriate privacy enhancing technical 
mechanisms available on market as well as the ease with which the majority of 
consumers disclose personal information as long as they perceive an immediate benefit 
(access to a product or availability of a service) arising from this disclosure. Therefore, I 
                                                 
32 Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, “Privacy as a fundamental human 
right vs.an economic right: an attempt to conciliation” 1999 available at 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/userfiles/page_attachments/pr-right.pdf ( last visited July 18th 2005), page 14 
33 see: Tamara Dinev & Paul Hart: ‘Privacy Concerns And Internet Use – A Model Of Trade-Off Factors’ 
(2004), G.R Milne & A. J Rohm & S. Bahl: ‘Consumers’ Protection of Online Privacy and Identity’  The 
Journal of Consumer Affairs, vol. 38, no. 2, 2004 
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do not envisage the lack of the “corresponding empowerment” as a legal vacuum, but 
rather as a practical consequence of the existing informational asymmetry between the 
parties. 
One of the negative features of the secondary uses of the personal information is 
that the individual, even if he agreed to some “sharing” of his personal data to “favorite, 
selected, well reputed partners” knows very little about the processes actually involving 
the personal data he discloses (especially since his consent will not be further asked for 
when the “well reputed partner” sells further the data it received ), but is only faced with 
the end-consequences of  this disclosure: some advertisements rather than other, certain 
unsolicited commercial e-mails.  
In this context, if the e-commerce is to enjoy further the consumer’s interest and 
trust, marketers and businesses should respect the individual’s preoccupation for their 
own privacy thus keeping in focus the difference between what is technologically 
possible to be achieved and what it is ethical to be achieved( and ultimately in the interest 
of a good public image ). Respect in this case cannot be limited to a general declaration of 
good practice, but should be effectively implemented into the business practice of those 
dealing with it. 
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Section 2:  E-mail address as personal data  
As shown in the previous section, the use of personal data in direct marketing, 
raises concerns among the data subjects regarding their ability to exercise control and to 
keep track of the personal information available about them on-line and about the way 
this information is used. To be able to tell if their concerns are justified and to discuss 
whether or not appropriate protective mechanisms are in place, a more fundamental 
question needs to be answered first. What exactly is the information about which the 
individuals claim protection?  
If few people would doubt that a social security or a personal ID number are 
personal data, as well as the credit card number or bank account and the information that 
can be drawn from it (spending patterns, purchases made, solvency). However, the e-mail 
address is more difficult to qualify due to its intrinsic features and its function. I will 
discuss these aspects in the following lines. 
Formally speaking, an e-mail address is formed by two parts separated by the @ 
character.  
The right part identifies the host where the recipient has an account. Since the 
mail server can host a great number of e-mail addresses, this part rarely constitutes 
personal data when the e-mail service is free of charge and accessible worldwide (take 
a.b@yahoo.com or a.b@gmail.com). On the other hand, if the rightful holder of an e-mail 
address is a business, the right part of the @ sign easily enables the identification, due to 
the fact that it coincides with the website address and most likely the trademark of the 
business. For example, a business registered as “Addvances”, has 
http://www.addvances.ro/ as a website address and office@addvances.ro as a contact e-
mail address.  
On the left side of the @sign, a group of characters (letters and numbers most if 
the times) describes “the name” with which a user is known by the e-mail service.  While 
it is true this name is unique for every e-mail account opened within an e-mail host 
server, there is no technical obligation that the identifier be the actual name of the 
individual opening an account, and there are no limitations regarding the number of on-
line identifiers ( e-mail addresses) that a person can have. In fact, most of the users have 
at least two e-mail addresses, one for business, and the other one for personal 
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communications. At the same time, the e-mail account can be accessed from any 
computer connected to the Internet, no matter where it is located.  
On the other hand, the most important criteria in order to qualify certain data as 
being personal is its ability to lead, directly or indirectly to the identification of the 
individual to whom they belong34. In the law literature this criteria has been 
contextualized by reference to the relevant agent of the identification, the ease, the 
precision or the validity of the identification35. What is important here is that the 
identification was seen as leading to a “flesh and blood” person, and not to a simple on-
line identity, that does not necessarily coincide with the legal36, off-line one. Can the e-
mail address pass this test? Does the e-mail address contain enough information so as the 
identity of an actual living individual be brought to light by employing “all means likely 
reasonably to be used”37. If the e-mail address was registered as belonging to a certain 
“John Smith”, does this mean that John Smith actually exists or that he is the one 
registered in the phone book as John Smith? Since the use of the e-mail address is not 
dependant on a fix IP address from where the real John Smith communicates, can we say 
that the identification process finished once it has been established, predictably 
otherwise, that the address belongs to “someone”? I was not able to find the final answer 
to any of these questions, although I’m convinced that it is technologically viable to 
claim that such a connection can be established in special circumstances, by using 
additional data regarding, for example the use of a certain credit card associated with 
someone registering on a site with the e-mail address and a password. It is my personal 
opinion that the “personal data” character of e-mail address is taken for granted since I 
was able to find lots of indications both in law, and in official documents38, that e-mail 
address is, in fact, to be seen as personal data, but without any further explanations. As I 
see it, one reason for this is that is a real, actual person (legal or natural) who suffers the 
                                                 
34 see article 2(a) of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of the individuals with regard to processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, Official Journal  L 281, 23/11/ 1995 P. 0031-0050 
35 Lee A. Bygrave, “DATA PROTECTION LAW, Approaching its rationale, Logic and Limits”, Kluwer 
Law International, 2002, page 42 
36 and by legal identity I mean the one recognized by the law, and confirmed by identity cards, birth 
certificates, administrative acts and so on 
37 see recital 26 of the Directive 95/46/EC 
38 for example, Presidency Paper (2004) (15148/04), op.cit., and DPWP Opinion 1/2000 (5007/00/EN/final)  
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costs (pecuniary or not) associated with any misuse of the e-mail address. But is it 
enough to make this person identifiable?  
Although national laws implementing the 95/46/EC Directive have transposed 
the broad expression in article 2(a) of the Directive, making use of unquantifiable terms 
like “relating to” or “that can be linked” or “concerning” an identified/ identifiable 
individual39, two examples can be offered to illustrate how, in practice, national courts 
can reinterpret the legal texts so as to introduce a supplementary criteria in order to 
determine if data should be regarded as personal in a certain context, and award it 
protection as such.  
The first example is the Eastweek case40, in front of the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal, not an European case, however a good example of case law for the issue in 
discussion. Although the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance did not specify this 
explicitly41, the Court decided that it is of the essence of the act of personal data 
collection that the data user is compiling information about “an identified person” or 
about “a person whom the data user intends or seeks to identify”. In the case, the fact 
that photography, when published, was capable of conveying the identity of the subject 
did not make the act of taking the photograph an act of personal data collection if the 
photographer acted without knowing or being at all interested in ascertaining the identity 
of the person being photographed.  
Depending on the interpretation given, two conclusions could be inferred from 
this case, and they are both relevant for the present discussion. We can say either that 
data is not to be regarded as personal if its collector did not intend to use it for 
identification purposes, or that not any collection of personal data is to be subjected to the 
same exigencies: if the data controller wishes to identify a person based on the collected 
data more stringent principles and rules should be in place than in the situation where 
such an intention is absent.  
Referring now back to the explanations I provided in the second section of the 
first chapter, what has been reproached to spammers is the fact that, as opposed to the e-
                                                 
39 see http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/nationalcomm/index_en.htm for texts of  national 
data protection laws 
40  information about the case can be found at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk , Eastweek Publisher Ltd v 
Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data [2000] 1 HKC 692 
41 see article 1(2) of the Ordinance 
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mail marketers, they send the commercial e-mails indiscriminately and in bulk, and not 
adapt their message to the interests and wishes of the potential receiver. The addresses 
are collected from public spaces or guessed through specially designed software. It is 
obvious that the spammer has no intention to discover preferences and to establish a 
personal profile of the person whose address is collected and used. In fact as long as the 
address is active and in use, for a spammer it represents just an environment through 
which it makes known the indiscriminate message that was meant to be sent. If the 
European Courts would apply a similar criteria, the would be little justification for the 
individual’s privacy intrusion claims (which does not mean they would not have an 
action if they proved the financial and personal damage subsequent to receiving spam, 
but this action would have a different legal basis than a privacy infringement claim ) 
The second example is the Durant case42, in the UK, where the Court of Appeal 
stated that some information shall not be regarded as personal, even if the name of the 
person appears on it. The “name will only be ‘personal data’ where its inclusion in the 
information affects the named individual’s privacy.” The mere reference to a person’s 
name where the name is not associated with any other personal information is given as an 
example of information that is not to be regarded as personal. 43 Would the e-mail address 
pass this test? It is interesting that the name associated with the person’s address is 
regarded by the UK Information Commissioner44 as personal information. The e-mail 
address includes both, the person’s on-line name (or at least one of them) and it’s on-line 
address (or at least a P.O box) so it would appear that the question could receive a 
positive answer. 
As mentioned before, several official European documents state directly or let 
one infer that e-mail addresses are personal data. The 2002 Privacy Directive states in 
Recital 26 that the traffic data “contain information on the private life of natural persons 
and concern the right to respect for their correspondence or concern the legitimate 
interests of legal persons”. Considering the provisions of Recital 15 and article 2(b) of the 
                                                 
42 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), UK 
43 see http://www.jonathanmitchell.info/uploads/Durant.pdf  for the Information Commissioner’s comments 
44 ibidem. 
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same Directive, e-mails could be included in this category45. More directly, in the 
wording of Data Protection Working Party, “the e-mail address is indispensable in 
establishing a connection. It is also, however, a valuable source of information which 
includes personal data on the user”46 . The same institution, the Data Protection 
Working Party, in a document regarding the minimum requirements for collecting 
personal data on-line, dedicates one chapter to the “Collection of addresses for direct 
marketing by e-mail and the dispatch of newsletters”47. Moreover, the UK Direct 
Marketing Association in its Code of Practice, states explicitly that “business information 
and e-mail addresses from which a living individual can be identified may also be 
regarded as personal data and therefore should be covered by these rules”48. 
While the legal instruments quoted above have different binding force on the 
Member States49, they have an unquestioned authority on the enforcement authorities of a 
Member State, especially absent an explicit provision in the Directives stating the fact 
that e-mail addresses are personal data.  
                                                 
45 see also DPWP 5063/00/EN/FINAL The following items are normally considered to be included under 
the definition of "traffic data": 
e-mail address and IP address of sender 
type, version and language of the client agent 
e-mail address of receiver 
date and time of sending the e-mail  
46 DPWP “Privacy on the Internet” (2000),  op.cit., pp. 32, 
47 DPWP “ Recommendation 2/2001, 5020/01/EN/ Final, Chapter 4, point 28, available at: 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp43en.pdf (last visited July 31, 
2005). 
48 section 5.3 of the Code of practice for direct marketing ( 3rd edition ), available at www.dma.org.uk (last 
visited July 31, 2005). 
49 as pointed out in the Introductory Chapter, the opinions of the Data Protection Working Party are non 
binding instruments, whereas the provisions in the Directives need to be transposed, as a rule, by the 
Member States into national laws.  
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 Section 3: E-mail marketing and spam practices50
 
After having explored in the first section of this chapter the importance of 
personal data for the advertising practice today, and argued on the personal data features 
of the e-mail addresses, it is important to comment on some of the practices that, de facto, 
set the dividing line between e-mail marketing, as legitimate practice, with proven 
benefits both for the customers and marketers, and SPAM as nuisance and anomaly 
having “reached worrying proportions”51. The features of the two distinct practices will 
be high lightened through the four relevant categories used in the Introduction, for the 
purposes of defining spam.  
1. the means to collect the e-mail addresses 
It is possible for the interested parties52 to get hold of possible customers’ e-
mail addresses :  
a. directly from the owner of the address, who agrees to disclose his address in order 
to receive certain types of commercial communication – this is a typical situation of 
permission based marketing. This method sets the basis for long-term commercial 
relation between the parties based on trust and mutually beneficial. 
b. indirectly, without the knowledge of the e-mail address owner,: 
- who is unaware that his address will be used in the future for direct marketing . 
This is the typical situation where the user posts his address in a public space on 
the Internet. The user disclosed his address for purposes different than that of 
receiving commercial communications from different marketers. However, 
spamware tools can be employed in order to automatically navigate websites, 
newsgroups and chat rooms and collect the e-mail addresses found there. 
Whereas the “collection of e-mail addresses from public spaces on the Internet 
                                                 
50 more technical details relating to the e-marketing and spam practices can be found in two studies: Rubin 
& Lenard (2001), op.cit. and Gauthronet & Drouard (2001). However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to present them in similar level of detail. 
51 COM(2004) 28 final . 
52 I will use the term “ marketer” to designate the person that uses direct marketing, as prescribed by the 
law and the various codes of good practice, and the term “spammer” in order to designate the person that 
does not comply with the same rules, while engaging in direct marketing. 
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for the purposes of unsolicited commercial e-mail ” has been considered 
“contrary to the existing community legislation”53, studies have shown that the 
addresses posted on public spaces of the Internet are the main source of the 
spammers thus exposing their owners to the greatest amount of spam54.  
Another typical situation is that of the insufficiently attentive user that was 
mislead by the wording or the design of the webpage and was not aware that he 
gave his consent (especially when the marketer uses a pre checked box, or a 
negative option statement55). While this technique does not in theory amount to 
spam, as somehow consent was asked and given, marketers are recommended 
not to use this strategy, as the image they create in the eyes of the customers 
will be negative56, and the  results doubtful57  
- who is unaware that that his address is being harvested at all. This technique is 
clearly typical for spam. Such a "brute force" attack on the mail server, where 
the software used by the spammer sends spam messages to all possible 
combination of letters that could form an e-mail address, generated a 
tremendous amount of spam, even to addresses that hadn't been shared 
anywhere58. There is little that can be done by an individual user when faced to 
this sort of spam, unless he chooses a more complicated e-mail, more difficult to 
detect through “dictionary attacks”. 
See the following example: 
 
                                                 
53  DPWP(2000), 5063/00/EN/FINAL, op.cit. 
54 “Why Am I Getting All This Spam?” Unsolicited Commercial E-mail Research, Center for Democracy & 
Technology March 2003, available at:  http://www.cdt.org/speech/spam/030319spamreport.pdf  ( last 
visited July 28, 2005). 
55 checking a box, calling or writing the marketer if the customer does NOT want to be on a mailing list 
56 “It is in the interest of business to be able to use legitimate commercial e-mail and be associated with 
ethical e-mail marketing using industry codes of conduct such as these guidelines. Unfavorable attitudes 
generate consumer skepticism and can lead consumers to take actions that are catastrophic to businesses” 
ICC Guidelines on Marketing and Advertising using Electronic Media, 2004. 
57 “the negative option statements was relatively inefficient, whereas the yes/no format proved to be more 
efficient: more honest way of asking for permission than a negative format , more conducive to building 
customer relationships. Consumers see the direct yes no format as an invitation, whereas the negative 
option as a challenge”: George R. Milne (1997), study regarding consumer’s willingness to provide 
marketers with personal information and permission to rent this information given in varied permission 
formats. The author commented also that as customers become more aware of the transfer practices, they 
may come to expect that marketers will be more straightforward in their communications. 
58 According to CDT (2003) study, see footnote 54 
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Date: Mon, 04 Jul 2005 07:24:41 -0500 
From: "Steve Dauman P.manager" <seabird@infinito.it>  Add to Address Book
To:  dancohen58@yahoo.com 
CC: 
 dancohn1@yahoo.com,  dancoi2000@yahoo.com,  dancointl@yahoo.com, 
dancoj2000@yahoo.com 
Subject: The unique possibility to increase your income. Protection code:GE-4177 
 
2. the transmission practices:  are, in my opinion, the main trait 
distinguishing e-mail marketing from spam. Although both practices involve electronic 
unsolicited commercial messages, the marketers and spammers use different strategies to 
get their message through to their potential customers. First of all, spamware programs 
can automatically generate false headers and false return address information59.  On the 
other hand, this practice is banned by the existing legislation and the applicable codes of 
practice, both in Europe and in the US60.  
Also, mailing tools used by spammers are capable of sending bulk e-mail 
without going through a specific mail server or ISP61, which avoids the trouble of being 
detected or having their accounts terminated due to the way they exhaust the bandwidth. 
Although marketers send as well the same e-mail advertising message to a great number 
of potential customers, they usually belong to the same cluster or are considered to have a 
special interest in the product or service being advertised. “If marketers failed to identify 
proper target groups and send unsolicited e-mail to massive audiences, negative effects 
                                                 
59 Background paper for the OECD workshop on spam”, DSTI/ICCP (2003)10/FINAL, 2003. 
60 see for example Recital 43 of  2002/58/EC Directive and Section 5(a) of the US CAN-Spam Act, as well 
as article3 of the ICC Guidelines on Marketing and Advertising using Electronic Media, 2004, Section 2.1 
of the European Code of Practice for the use of personal data in Direct Marketing,  FEDMA 2005.  
61 Serge Gauthronet and Etienne Drouard (2001), op.cit, page 32. 
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could be tremendous”62, potentially facing the contempt of both the customers and the 
business community ( complaints to upper administrative bodies, black listing).  
 Spam is also repetitive, and arguably very difficult to stop, since the 
unsubscribe lines do not work63. According to the OECD Paper on Spam64, spammers 
either open free e-mail accounts which they abandon before getting caught, or load in 
multiple accounts, so that when one of them is terminated, another one becomes 
automatically active. The marketers’ practice has to involve as a fundamental 
requirement, the possibility for the customers to opt out from receiving further 
commercial messages65.  
 Taking into account the e-mail harvesting methods used, it is easy to realise 
that spam messages are untargeted and indiscriminate as to the potential receiver. In fact, 
a big part of the nuisance caused by spam to the users is represented by the discomfort of 
constantly having to spend time and effort, as well as money in order to get rid of 
unsolicited, useless66 emails. On the matter, the Guidelines67 issued by the International 
Chamber of Commerce recommend in article 9 to all marketers, that in case they do send 
unsolicited commercial e-mails as part of their marketing strategy, they should “have 
reasonable grounds to believe” that the consumer targeted will find the offer of interest 
for him.   
3. the content 
 From the point of view of the content, there are similarities between spam 
practices and e-mail marketing. Although spam can include scams (humanitarian or 
phishing), pornographic content or viruses, the great majority of it is still aiming at 
                                                 
62  Susan Chang, Mariko Morimoto “An Assessment of Consumer Attitudes toward Direct Marketing 
Channels: A Comparison between Unsolicited E-Mail and Postal Direct Mail” Michigan State University 
April 1, 2003 available at  http://www.inma.org/subscribers/papers/2003-Chang-Morimoto.doc ( last visited 
2005-07-28). 
63 in fact, users are advised not to click on the unsubscribe links ( if they are provided), as they will only 
thereby confirm that the address is valid, used…and good to spam further. 
64 See above, footnote 59 
65 as I will point out both in Section 1 Chapter 3 of this thesis 
66 studies quoted in the OECD Paper on SPAM claim that even a very low response rate (0.001%) is 
enough to make spamming profitable (see page 9) due to the low costs involved in producing and sending 
them. 
67 “These Guidelines (…) are an expression of the business community's recognition of its social 
responsibilities in respect of marketing activities and communications. The Guidelines have been updated 
in light of experience acquired, and ICC, conscious of the ongoing development, commits itself to regularly 
review them to ensure their continued viability” 
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advertising products and services. What differs often is the quality and the truthfulness of 
whatever “special offer” is being presented there.   
4. the position of the receiver with regard to the unsolicited 
communication received. 
The overwhelming majority of customers don’t like receiving spam. It’s 
unsolicited, unwanted, useless and unstoppable. It imposes unjustified costs on the 
targeted end-users without bringing any benefit. Some distinctions should be made here 
regarding the terms used. While the offers received from a company that sold you a 
computer might be seen as “unsolicited”, there is a high likelihood that they are 
“wanted”, and “useful” (even if I don’t choose to buy the products or request the services, 
I can be thus informed about the latest products available and even compare prices and 
find out whether a better offer is available on market for something I’m interested in). 
According to EASA68, once the individual has given his consent to the use of his contact 
details for marketing purposes, all the subsequent communications he receives from that 
source are deemed to be “solicited” even if the individual is not aware of the future 
content of these communications. While I don’t argue the level of expertise in this 
Communication, I don’t agree with the interpretation of the meaning of the verb “to 
solicit”69. While the commercial communications subsequent to a manifestation of 
consent cannot be seen as spam, they are and remain unsolicited, but they deemed to be 
accepted, wanted, useful ( for as long as the consent is not revoked through the exercise 
of the right to opt-out). In my view, you cannot solicit something and not know what you 
will receive as the result of your solicitation.  
It can be argued that the customers had to deal with unsolicited commercial 
communications as a result of direct marketing long before the Internet came into play, 
and this is one of the risks inherent to having multiple choices in terms of offers for 
similar products and services. The marketers become more aggressive in bringing their 
offer in the attention of the public. However, the level of consumer annoyance when 
faced with unsolicited e-mails is, for some consumers, higher than in case of other forms 
                                                 
68 “Recommendations for the issue paper for the EU Workshop on unsolicited commercial communications 
or spam”, November 4th 2003,  page 4 available at, 
http://www.easa-alliance.org/news_views/en/position_spam%20issue.pdf (last visited July 28, 2005) 
69 To make solicitation or petition for something desired, to seek to obtain by persuasion, entreaty, or 
formal application, synonyms: to ask for, to request, to seek 
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of unsolicited direct marketing (brochures in the mail, for example)70. The receivers have 
to bear the online service costs according to the time spent online, risk loosing important 
mail due to limitation in the storage space of their e-mail boxes, and waste time sorting 
out the important e-mails from the unwanted ones.  
These are inconveniences that the end users have not faced before and the 
cumulative social and economical impact of this unfair business practice, spam, called for 
special measures to limit and if possible put a stop to it. 
                                                 
70 see Susan Chang, Mariko Morimoto, op.cit, page 6 
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CHAPTER 2 
Values and interests involved in spam practices 
“Whereas data-processing systems are designed to 
serve man; whereas they must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural 
persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably their right to 
privacy and contribute to economic and social progress, trade expansion and 
the well being of individuals”71
 
Section 1: Different interests that need to be safeguarded by the anti-spam 
legal provisions 
 
The European legislator adopted a two-sided approach to the spam 
phenomenon. One of the approaches views spam as an illegitimate marketing technique 
and thus provides for corrective mechanisms pertaining to the e-commerce activity, 
reflecting at the same time the need to ensure the growth of e-commerce and the 
competitiveness of the European industry72. The other approach considers that spam 
involves most of the times, an illegal processing of personal data, and providing therefore 
safeguards aimed, for the most part, at protecting the individuals whose fundamental right 
of privacy is infringed through the personal data processing, and leaves to the Member 
States the choice of an appropriate mechanism for the protection of the “legitimate 
interests of the legal persons”. 
It is manifest therefore, that in finding the appropriate dosage for the legislative 
antidote to the spam anomaly, the normative solutions (and all other solutions for that 
matter) have to weight the different values and interests that different actors claim 
recognition upon.  
                                                 
71 “Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 2. 
72 See Recital 2 of the E-commerce Directive 
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On the one hand, as pointed out in Section 1 of the first chapter, direct 
marketers grasped the utility of building consumer profiles, targeting audience with their 
commercial message and allocating resources in a more cost-effective way. While 
“interruption marketing”73, an advertising practice that interrupts people from whatever 
they are doing (watching a movie, reading a magazine, walking on the street) is losing its 
efficiency74, permission based marketing is only starting to prove itself. Targeted 
advertising by e-mail, for example, involves limited costs and exposure of the advertised 
products or services potentially to a worldwide market. Hence, the main interest of the 
direct marketers is the economic profitability of businesses, both in terms of reducing the 
costs associated with the provision of the services or the supply of goods and in terms of 
increasing their revenues resulted from the business activity. This particular business 
interest can of course be correlated with additional ones, relating, for example to gaining 
the trust of customers, as well as with the overall development of competitive European 
e-commerce services. All of these might be broken down into smaller and more detailed 
interests and associated values. This fragmentation is however beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Using instead a simple mean of expression, I will refer to these interests as 
“economic incentive interests”.  
On the other hand, within the e-mail marketing activities (and implicitly75, in 
spam) the end – users have interests that pertain to the different perspectives from which 
their involvement can be seen: as prospective clients or as the holders of the e-mail 
addresses used to disseminate the commercial messages.  
As prospective clients, the receivers of the commercial messages are first of all 
interested in having information, about a large number of products and services. 
However, if they are to benefit from the broad offer, the information about it needs to be 
complete (that is, to include all details that are needed for a subsequent purchase), 
accurate (truthful), and last but not least, useful (that is, to correspond to a present or 
potential need). Secondly, the potential clients are interested in having access to the 
goods and services available on the market, that is, to be able to use the appropriate 
                                                 
73 Seth Godin: “Permission Marketing: Turning strangers into friends, and friends into customers” Simon & 
Schuster –New York-1999 
74 idem, pag.75 
75 i am considering here the traits that are common to the two activities, as explained in Chapter 1 Section 2 
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electronic communication tools that would enable them to purchase the good or service 
they desire. Once they discover various e-commerce applications (such as on-line 
reservations, ATMs, web purchases, goods and services readily available for on-line use 
or download, access to databases) and acquire positive experiences from using them, the 
great majority are not likely to give them up. When it comes to being the receivers of a 
commercial offer by e-mail, businesses as potential clients (within business-to-business 
relations) can be said to have the same interests as the consumers in that regard76; this 
view is otherwise reflected by the E-commerce Directive, which subjects the commercial 
communications77 to the same legal regime, without discrimination in relation to the type 
of legal personality of the receiver78. In practice, this means the same freedom of choice 
for the Member States, according to the E-commerce Directive to permit or to forbid 
unsolicited commercial communications, and the same transparency requirements, 
though not necessarily the same rules will apply for business-to-business and business-to- 
consumer communications within the same Member State (that can prohibit one and 
permit the other, with associated safeguards).  
 From a different perspective, the end-users can be regarded as holders of the e-
mail addresses used to disseminate the commercial messages. As explained in Section 2, 
most of the times, the e-mail addresses can be regarded as personal data (and in fact they 
are treated in the existing legislation and in the doctrine as such). By using the term 
“holders”, I do not intend to suggest my adhesion to the doctrine claiming the data 
subject’s ownership over his own personal data79, but merely that e-mail addresses are 
the part of the on-line identity of a certain user, whether he is a corporate 
(office@business.ro) or a private person (a.b@serviceprovider.no ). In what it is regarded 
as the European legislative answer to spam, the existing privacy legislation discriminates 
between the two categories, providing safeguards for the “privacy interests” of the 
                                                 
76 this does not exclude a different valuation of these interests as well as  a different  manner to express 
them, and different safeguarding mechanisms available to each of the two groups: businesses and 
consumers 
77 see articles 6 and 7 of the E-Commerce Directive.  
78 one exception is the reference to the opt-out registries in which “natural persons” can register themselves 
(article 7(2) ). 
79 see James Rule & Lawrence Hunter: ‘Towards property rights in Personal Data’, Kenneth C. Laudon :  
‘Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy: Mechanisms of Pricing Information’. 
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subscribers that are natural persons80 and recognising the “legitimate interests of the legal 
persons”.  
The privacy interests of the individuals have been thoroughly commented81, and 
some of the findings can be applied for the present discussion, which considers only 
those interests that are involved in the e-mail marketing activity and endangered by the 
spam practices. Empirical studies further document the nature and the intensity of privacy 
concerns perceived by the data subjects when approached by a direct marketer82 . 
Considering the dichotomy made by Bygrave (2002) 83, they pertain mostly to the 
interests of individuals as data subjects, although it can be said that the individuals hold 
also some interest in the uses to which personal data is put  (for example when spammers 
collect and use e-mail addresses beyond the original purpose of their release by the 
holder). As data subjects, the individuals are interested in maintaining control over and in 
determining freely how others process their personal data (informational self-
determination)84. This informational self determination includes85, insight (the interest of 
the data subject in knowing who is processing data about him and why), outflow control( 
the flow of information from himself to others, in this case what information about him 
are known to the marketer) as well as inflow control (the end-user’s interest in controlling 
what information he receives from the others) and has close links with the interest in 
attentional self determination (that is the interest of the end-user in being able  to direct 
his attention to what he chooses).  
Due to their specificity, these interests still stand when the unsolicited 
commercial e-mail message is sent to the legal persons (although they might not be 
justified through privacy rights86). They are the expression of a legal person’s need to act 
autonomously and to use rationally and efficiently the resources it possesses. Several 
studies attempt to calculate the financial loss of companies due to the spam messages sent 
                                                 
80 see article 13 (5) of the 2002 Privacy Directive, read in accordance with Recital 40 of the same Directive. 
81 See Lee Bygrave (2002) op.cit.,Chapter 7 and the sources cited therein.  
82 see, for example, Alessandro Acquisti, Jens Grossklags (2005), “Privacy and rationality in individual 
decision making ”, Alessandro Acquisti, Jens Grossklags (2004) “ Privacy attitudes and privacy 
behaviour”, Dinev & Hart (2004), op.cit., Bartel &Hoy (2000), op.cit., George R.Milne (2000), op.cit, 
George R.Milne (1997), op.cit,  Ross D  PETTY(2000), op.cit, Chang, Morimoto (2003), op.cit.  
83 Bygrave (2002), op.cit,  page 150. 
84 see Section 1 of Chapter 2 in this thesis 
85 See Bygrave (2002), op.cit, 151 
86 see Bygrave (2002), Chapter 12 
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to their e-mail addresses87. These costs comprise the loss of productivity88 as the 
employees are wasting time sorting and purging their accounts from unwanted mail 
(especially since they have to discern between spam messages and other unsolicited but 
wanted commercial e-mails), investment in spam filters and associated costs 
(implementation , supervision)89 and increased dial up costs due to extra time spent on-
line. It is obvious that the businesses have a legitimate interest in the profitability of their 
activity and therefore this interest needs “sufficient protection” too. 
 
Although the interests presented above are not necessarily conflicting, in the 
attempt to protect one value from the negative effects of spam, other values suffer side 
effect limitations also. For example, in the attempt to cut down spam, measures aimed at 
controlling the collection of e-mail addresses and protect privacy can be regarded by the 
marketers as a disincentive for e-commerce and a barrier to entry, especially for SMEs 
starting to do business on-line. Similarly, the exchange between partner firms of lists of 
e-mail addresses collected within customer relations, arguably acceptable as business 
practice, is questionable from the personal data protection perspective.  
 
Section 2: Unsolicited commercial communications – a concern for 
individual privacy?  
The difficulty in answering this question resides in the complexity of the notion 
“privacy” and in the multitude of values and interests safeguarded by the data protection 
laws90. By examining the specificity of the data processing conducted for the purposes of 
direct marketing, I can argue that the most significant privacy concern of the individual 
faced with the massive phenomenon of spam is the lack of control over the use of his 
personal data, including here the related interest in attentional self determination. Lack of 
                                                 
87  See for example “SPAM-The serial ROI killer” (2004), available at 
  http://www.nucleusresearch.com/research/e50.pdf (last visited 21 Aug. 05), See also Gauthronet, Drouard 
(2001), op.cit. at page 67. These findings are consistent with many others, such as:  
88  £460 per UK employee per year in wasted time, according to Jean-Jacques Sahel International 
Communications DTI, United Kingdom, see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/3/33713587.pdf (last visited 
21 Aug. 05) 
89  see Matthew Prince (2004), op.cit. pp. 8 (last visited 21 Aug. 05) 
 
90 see L.A. Bygrave, op.cit., especially Chapters 3 and 7. 
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control implies also the inability to make choices about the boundaries of one’s own 
privacy. First of all, the individual becomes little aware or not aware at all when his 
personal data is collected. Secondly, the individual becomes post factum aware that his 
personal data was subjected to secondary uses, to which he hasn’t consented. Most spam 
studies consulted for the purposes of this thesis contained, at a certain point, an attempt to 
answer the question: “Where did the spammers get my address from?” The Data 
Protection Working Party underlined also the importance of providing to the subjects 
sufficient guarantees and adequate information so that they are able to “place their trust in 
the sites with which they enter into contact” and to “exercise choices”91. 
While personal privacy is recognised as a fundamental human right92, its scope 
and ambit are difficult to define through the adoption of uniform and universal standards, 
as different individuals value differently their own privacy, thus building their own 
hierarchy of rights. Therefore, they are willing to sacrifice one for the sake of the other 
according to cognitive and emotional resolutions, that are hard to anticipate and even 
harder to generalise. However “while privacy protection is an individual concern, its 
effective enforcement may only come through collective action”93 . 
Somehow spontaneously, individuals tend to regard personal information about 
them as “belonging” to them, that they feel like being its rightful owners, therefore 
claiming a right to choose to whom and in what circumstances to disclose it. Since the e-
mail address as online identity is mine, and I am the only one using it, I must be given the 
right to chose to whom it will be disclosed (and I am not considering here the situation in 
which the disclosure is compelled by a public authority exercising its authority). At the 
same time, if the Inbox is my personal space online, it can be assimilated to my home: it 
is out there in the street so everyone can see it, however, I decide who is allowed to enter 
and for what purpose.   
On the other hand, the large scale availability of personal data, as well as the 
apparent lack of any enforceable ownership rights over it, favours the direct 
marketers’tendency to view personal information as a public good, largely available, that 
can be simultaneously possessed by all the individuals, whose consumption rights are not 
                                                 
91 DPWP 5020/01/EN/Final Recommendation 2/2001  
92 see article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights 
93 see Ann Cavoukian (1999), op.cit, page 7 
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exclusive94, and whose exploitation can ultimately bring financial benefits for all the 
parties involved. 
The need to settle this divergence of opinion over the ownership of information 
lead to the creation of the concept “information sensitivity” that was supposed to scale 
the level of privacy concern felt by a consumer in a particular situation about a certain 
type of data95. However, it appears that the conclusion reached reinforced the belief that 
privacy concerns are mostly situational. 
According to George R. Milne96, consumer privacy has been defined as the 
consumer’s ability to control (a) the presence of other people in the environment during a 
market transaction or consumption behavior and (b) dissemination of information related 
to or provided during such transactions or behaviors to those who were not present. 
As the marketers aim at targeting their offer to the manifested interests of their 
customers, today’s marketplace tends to be more and more customer tailored. Therefore 
participating in the commercial exchanges and benefiting from a wide variety of goods 
and services implies giving up some of your privacy. This trade-offs between equally 
important interests should be based on rational decisions reached by informed consumers. 
Many consumers provide willingly personal information when they sign up for mailing 
lists so they can be contacted at a later date. Others provide information if they are 
sufficiently rewarded with a benefit manifested through better targeted offers or 
guarantees about subsequent contact or use of the information.   
According to Ross D Petty97, consumers might be hesitant to provide marketers 
with information as long as the resulting contact they receive from direct marketers is too 
costly, including the non pecuniary transaction costs of ignoring and disposing of 
information, as well as pecuniary costs of paying for unexpected telephone charges or 
disposal/recycling fees.  
                                                 
94 see Ann Cavoukian (1999), op.cit, page 14 
95 Kim Bartel Sheehan and Mariea Grubbs Hoy  “ Dimensions of privacy concerns among online 
consumers” Journal of public Policy and Marketing( 2000), 19 spring, 62-73 
96 George R.Milne, “ Privacy and ethical issues in database/ interactive marketing and public policy: a 
research framework and overview of the special issue ” in Journal of public policy and marketing, vol. 
19(1), spring 2000, 1-6 
97 Ross D  PETTY, “ Marketing without consent: consumer choice and costs, privacy and public policy”, 
Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, no.19 (spring) 2000, pages 42-53  
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I found most interesting and relevant to the discussion about privacy concerns 
related to the unsolicited commercial e-mails that, according to Bartel and Hoy (2000)98, 
privacy concerns among on-line consumers appear when the information usage is not 
expected by the consumer, either because he was not aware that his personal data was 
used, or that the use was different from the one originally intended. The authors correlate 
their empirical findings with the ones reached by Cranor, Reagle and Ackerman (1999) 
99, that evidentiated the fact that when consumers were asked to provide their e-mail 
addresses, the information was not perceived as sensitive and therefore did not produce 
privacy concerns. However, the “fear of unfamiliar” caused by the inability to trace back 
the circumstances in which the marketer acquired the e-mail address increased their 
concerns100   
Overall, Bartel and Hoy (2000) estimate that their findings confirm earlier 
studies suggesting that privacy is a measure of the control of the transactions between the 
individual and others. When the transaction is immediate and involves only an exchange 
between a consumer and one entity, the consumer will feel more in control and thus, less 
concerned about privacy.  
As the transaction extends to multiple entities, beyond the user’s knowledge (as 
it is often the case when e-mail lists are traded between marketers), the consumer 
experiences loss of control thus increasing its concern for privacy. 
What seems obvious from the above mentioned studies is that in discussing 
privacy issues the private sector commercial interests need to be taken into account, in 
addition to the traditional human rights or ethical perspective. At the same time, the 
advantages provided by the direct marketing techniques can not be fully taken advantage 
of unless the personal data collected as part of the electronic transaction is strongly 
protected.  
Moreover, this protection could, on the long run contribute to the correction of 
the anomalies such as spam. 
 
                                                 
98 Sheehan Kim Bartel and Mariea Grubbs Hoy (2000), op.cit, page 66  
99 Lorrie Faith Cranor, Joseph Reagle, and Mark S. Ackerman “Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users' 
Attitudes About Online Privacy AT&T Labs-Research Technical Report TR 99.4.3” available at  
http://www.research.att.com/resources/trs/TRs/99/99.4/99.4.3/report.htm (last visited, August 03  2005) 
100 Bartel, Hoy, op.cit, page 68 
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Section 3: Privacy and economic interest –anti-spam initiatives 
between two focal points of interest 
According to article 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC, the processing of personal data 
is legitimate, among others101, when “the data subject has unambiguously given his 
consent” according to paragraph (a), or when the processing “is necessary for the 
purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by third party or parties to 
whom the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under 
article 1(1)”, according to paragraph (f), (my emphasis). Referring further to article 1(1), 
it becomes clear that the protection of personal data is seen, according to the Directive, as 
one such fundamental right of the data subject. Article 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC states 
the general rule with regard to the legitimacy of the personal data processing. However, 
turning to article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive, we notice the requirement that the 
processing of individual e-mail addresses for direct marketing is only permitted once the 
data subject has given his prior and informed consent. Using a simple “per a contrario” 
argument, it can be inferred that the balance of interests required by article 7(f) of the 
Directive 95/46/EC leaned in favour of the individual privacy although, direct marketing 
activities, as intrinsic part of e-commerce are, or can be conducted, legitimately102.  We 
can conclude on this point by saying that the 2002 Privacy Directive imposes a stricter 
regime for the data processor when the processing is done for direct marketing purposes, 
since the marketer cannot invoke his legitimate interests in collecting and using the e-
mail addresses of the natural persons as overriding the individual’s privacy rights. 
Therefore, he needs prior, informed consent in any processing of e-mail addresses done 
for direct marketing purposes. 
On the other hand, as I pointed out in Section 3 of Chapter 1, the E-Commerce 
Directive refers back to the Privacy Directives that are “fully applicable to information 
                                                 
101 only two paragraphs of article 7 can be regarded as relevant in the context of the present discussion, that 
is paragraphs (a) and (f) ; the others do not find their applicability when the issue of unsolicited commercial 
communications is discussed 
102 The conclusion is not surprising given the provisions of Recitals 6 and 7 of the 2002 Privacy Directive, 
which acknowledge the possibilities opened by the electronic communication services but highlight also the 
need for “legal, regulatory, and technical provisions” in order to protect “fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and legitimate interests of legal persons” 
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society services”103 , and the implementation and application of the E-Commerce 
Directive is to be made “in full compliance with the principles relating to the protection 
of personal data, in particular as regards unsolicited commercial communication”104. 
Would this include the view on the relative importance of privacy and data protection 
safeguards on one hand and economic incentive on the other?  
Considering article 1(3) of the E-Commerce Directive, stating that the Directive 
“complements Community law applicable to information society services without 
prejudice to the level of protection for, in particular, public health and consumer interests, 
as established by Community acts and national legislation implementing them in so far as 
this does not restrict the freedom to provide information society services” (my emphasis) 
I would argue otherwise. Following the distinction made by Moor (2004)105 between 
privacy as an instrumental value106 and privacy as an intrinsic value107 I would argue that 
the E-commerce Directive embraced the first view of privacy, while the Privacy 
Directive embraced the second one. 
In that regard, Recital 2 of the E-commerce Directive strongly emphasises the 
opportunities brought by the development of electronic commerce, in terms of 
employment, economic growth and investment in innovation by European companies, 
and enhanced competitiveness. This approach does not exclude the preoccupation for the 
privacy108 of the prospective client. This preoccupation is to be inferred also from the 
references made in Recital 11 to other pieces of Community legislation ensuring a 
narrower and thus a more targeted protection of the contractual weaker party. However, 
the main aim behind the provisions of article 6 and 7 of the Directive remains arguably, 
the development of e-commerce. Fair information practices as the ones contained in the 
Privacy Directives, if integrated in the privacy policy of a business, are there to send to 
the prospective client the message that the firm can be trusted109 with personal 
                                                 
103 according to Recital 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 
104 idem. 
105 James H.Moor, op cit, page 252. 
106 instrumental values are those values that are good because they lead to something else which is good 
(Moor (2002) page 252 ).  
107 Intrinsic values are those that are good in themselves ( idem ). 
108 see the definition given to consumer privacy in chapter 2 of this thesis, and also in Cathy Goodman’s 
article “ Privacy: Recognition of a consumer right” in Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 
109 the concept of “ trust” has been interpreted as “ the willingness of one party, here a consumer, to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party, here a firm, based on the expectation that the firm will perform a 
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information disclosed by the customer110. The idea is stated expressly in Recital 7 of the 
E-commerce directive, as “in order to ensure legal certainty and consumer confidence, 
this Directive must lay down a clear and general framework to cover certain legal aspects 
of electronic commerce in the internal market”( my emphasis).   
 The provisions of article 7 of the E-commerce Directive can be seen as serving 
well this purpose: commercial communications should be transparent (identifiable as 
such, originate from sources whose identity is disclosed), and the consumer should not be 
“annoyed” by commercial communications when he clearly manifested his intention not 
to receive such material in his Inbox.  
 The Privacy Directives on the other hand assert the need for the individual to 
have a high level of protection that would equilibrate the information and bargaining 
power asymmetry between the business party and the individual. Reflecting the divergent 
approach to the relative weight of the two values, the opt-in regime introduced by the 
2002 Privacy Directive111 met strong opposition112 from the direct marketers, as they 
feared hindrance and unjustified restrictions in their activities as a consequence of the 
new privacy- friendly rules. Basically, according to the opt-in rules, the individual should 
not only be made to feel safe in disclosing data to a marketer, he should be the initiator of 
these relations and be able to bring them to an end by directly communicating his will to 
the marketer, not just by entering his address into a opt-out register. The consumer is 
therefore given not only knowledge, but also a certain amount of control.113  
Despite this primary difference of focus between the normative acts analysed 
above, it is obvious that the processing personal data is becoming more and more closely 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular action of importance to the customer, independent of the customer’s ability to monitor or to 
control the firm” ( Mayer et al. “An integrative Model of Organizational Trust” (1995), Academy of 
management review 20(3), 709-734, ). I subscribe to this opinion.  
110 Mary J.Culnan & Robert J. Bies, “Managing Privacy Concerns Strategically: The Implications of Fair 
Information Practices for Marketing in the Twenty first Century”, article in “Visions of Privacy . Policy 
Choices for the Digital Age”, Collin J Bennett & Rebecca Grant (ed.), University of Toronto Press, 1999 
111 a regime that is claimed to ensure an enhanced privacy protection compared to the previous, opt-out one, 
consecrated by the E-Commerce Directive and the Directive 97/66/EC 
112 see Chapter 2 of this thesis (footnote 35) 
113 According to Moor (2002), reaching full control over the information other have about ourselves is 
almost a utopia in a highly computerized culture like ours today. It is more realistic to adopt a “restricted 
access view of privacy” and claim that only “the right kind of people” should have access to the 
information that is relevant for their purpose at the right time. See Moor (2002), op.cit , page 257. 
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connected to marketing and to the allocation of resources in e-commerce activities114. 
Privacy concerns will arise however when the speed and the convenience would be 
accompanied by, what is commonly referred in colloquial speech, improper, surprising 
use of this data115. Hence, while it is agreed that the individual needs in practice, a 
mechanism to acquire knowledge and be more in control of his personal data, the 
conceptual foundations such a mechanism differ. Is the public control legitimate and able 
to safeguard the fundamental human right to privacy through uniform principles stating 
“fair practices”? Should the individuals be given property rights over their personal data 
so as to trade their data according to their wishes?  
The difference in focus between the fundamental values protected by the two 
legislations is a useful point to bear in mind when answering the three questions about the 
efficiency of the anti-spam European legislation, as it is reflected all along the 
mechanisms provided as a solution to spam.  
                                                 
114 see Mary J.Culnan & Robert J. Bies op.cit, pp. 161 for a description of e-commerce activities involving 
the collection of personal data; see also Chapter 1, Section 2of this thesis. 
115 See Sheehan & Hoy (2000), op cit. 
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 CHAPTER 3: 
 Anti- spam legislation: a balance of interests 
“To date, the vast majority of the laws passed to regulate spam have been what can be 
called,[…] “sentiment laws.” Sentiment laws are designed to send a message about a 
community’s sentiment (e.g.: “we, as a community, oppose unsolicited commercial 
communications”) but put little effort or design into how they will actually be enforced. 
Sentiment laws tend to work well only in situations where there is no moral ambiguity, or 
the problem is in a nascent enough stage that the law can steer public opinion. Moreover, 
sentiment laws are inappropriate in instances where a few actors can, with relatively low 
cost or effort, cause widespread problems”116.  
 
While the first two chapters of this thesis evidentiated the spam practices in the 
business context in which they occur and balanced the interests and values that need to be 
safeguarded by the anti-spam legislation, this chapter aims at analysing the integrated 
legislative answer to spam conveyed by the European legislator through provisions   
pertaining both to e-commerce and data protection. 
 
Section 1: The response to “unsolicited commercial communications” in 
the e-commerce legislation 
 
As it aims to “ensure legal certainty and consumer confidence” 117 in the 
Internal Market,  and to “lay down a clear and general framework to cover certain legal 
aspects of electronic commerce”  the E-commerce Directive provisions should be, 
                                                 
116 Matthew B. Prince, “Countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law” (2004), available at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_How%20to%20craft%20and%20e
ffective%20anti-spam%20law.pdf (last visited  22 August 2005) 
117 Recital 7 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market, OJ L.178 of 17 July 2000 (commonly referred to as E-commerce Directive)  
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inevitably, the main starting point for an e-marketer wanting to conduct legitimate 
business on-line and to advertise the products and services it provides.  
As analysed in the previous chapters, the response rate of the potential clients to 
advertising techniques that interrupt constantly a person’s habitual activities, conveying 
an indiscriminate commercial content decreases, thus forcing the marketers to switch to a 
more permission based marketing and to adjust the content of the commercial 
communications to the profile of the potential targets. This can be achieved through using 
the personal data available on potential clients. It is at this point that the direct marketing 
techniques and especially e-mail marketing on one hand and spam practices on the other 
differentiate one from the other, justifying the regulatory intervention, with the view of 
reducing the latter phenomenon. 
The E-commerce Directive defines the “commercial communications” as: 
 “any form of communication designed to promote, directly or 
indirectly, the goods, services or image of a company, organisation 
or person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft activity or 
exercising a regulated profession”118  
As expected, the main trait identified here is the promotional character of the 
communication. Section 2 of the Directive and especially article 6 instantiate the 
“transparency requirement” hinted at in Recital 29 of the same Directive. In concreto, all 
commercial communications should be “clearly identifiable as such”119, specify the 
person (legal or natural) whose products or services are being advertised120, and clearly 
state any special conditions( promotions or offers, competitions or games) that are 
associated with the products or services being advertised121. These are general, basic 
conditions to be fulfilled by any commercial communication, solicited, or unsolicited by 
the customer (for example when a former client asks the firm to communicate him 
updated information about related products or services, as well as when, during an 
ongoing business relation, one of the parties communicate to the other some new services 
that it just started to provide). Although not explicitly targeted at spam messages, the 
                                                 
118 article 2(f) of the E-commerce Directive 
119 article 6(a) 
120 article 6(b) 
121 articles 6(c) and 6(d) 
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provisions in article 6 tackle two of the most common features of spam: the disguised 
commercial character and the forged sender information. The example provided in the 
beginning of Chapter 1 is illustrative on these two issues122.  
As for the practical ways to achieve transparency with regard to the commercial 
character of communications, the simplest solution one might think of would be to 
impose that any person advertising products or services mark the commercial e-mail they 
send with ADV. or a similarly agreed note. Although such a marking will have the 
advantage of allowing the filters to screen out with ease unsolicited commercial 
communications, it is not very likely that such an initiative will have more success than in 
the US where REDUCE Spam Act123 failed to meet the support of the US Congress 
because it imposed such an obligation. As it was shown124, this would have been a clear 
example of regulatory overkill, with implications reaching beyond spammers and 
threatening legitimate commercial activities involving among others, some unsolicited 
commercial communications. The commercial growth and the opportunities offered by 
the Internet would have been threatened while sending other types of content (political, 
porno graphical) through spam messages would have received an indirect approval. 
What could represent then the expression “clearly identifiable as such” (bearing 
in mind that the reference is made to all types of commercial communications- solicited 
or not). The Directive itself provides no supplementary guidance as to the practical steps 
that legal or natural persons have to follow in order to ensure this condition is fulfilled. 
As long as the Member States or the various National Direct Marketing Associations 
have the freedom to implement what they think is the most suitable strategy to transpose 
such standards of protection in the national laws, it is not very likely that the goal of 
ensuring a uniform level of protection all throughout the Internal Market will be 
                                                 
122 what I find amusing about this example, is that when I saved it from my e-mail, the automatic name of 
the picture representing the body text of the spam message was “cowman”…so much for genuine☺. 
Needless to say that my e-mail address is not dancogs2@yahoo.com 
123  standing for “Restrict and eliminate the delivery of unsolicited commercial electronic mail or Spam 
Act” 
124 Adam Mossoff “ Spam- Oy, what a nuisance!” in Berkley Technology Law Journal, vol.19:2 spring 
2004, page 638 
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achieved. However, the interpretation given by the International Chamber of Commerce 
supplements this lack of clarity in the Directive. It states125: 
“Where electronic communications have a commercial purpose, 
this should be apparent through the subject matter and context. 
Subject headers should not be misleading and the commercial 
nature should not be obscured”126
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2005 00:40:49 +0300 
From:  "Karla Groves" <lbxdbsypcuekfn@yahoo.com>  Add to Address Book
To:  dancohen228@yahoo.com 
Subject: Re [22]: 
Compare the spam message above with the e-mail marketing message below, 
coming from Dell Norge, unsolicited, still accepted as part of an existing business 
relation. 
To: dancoj2000@yahoo.com 
Subject: Utrolige sommertilbud online: Fri frakt + Dell 720 printer + skjermoppgradering! 
From: "Dell Norge" <no_gem_reply@dell.com>  Add to Address Book
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 10:45:53 -0600 
  
Establishing a clear line between the spam practices involving disguised or 
misleading header information and direct marketing has the benefit of pointing out the 
legitimate needs and the benefits of the commercial economic communications and also 
of allowing governments and others to focus on the real problem of harmful, fraudulent, 
malicious, misleading or illegal communications127.  
                                                 
125 “ICC Guidelines on Marketing and Advertising using Electronic Media” 2003, available on the 
International Chamber of Commerce webpage at: 
 http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/rules/2004/Guidelines-on-Marketing-and-Advertising-
using-Electronic-Media.asp  ( last visited 20 July 2005)   
126 article 4 of the  ICC Guidelines 
127 “ICC policy statement on 'spam' and unsolicited commercial electronic messages” available at 
http://www.camara-e.net/_upload%5C373-22_114_spam1.pdf  , ( last visited 20 July 2005) 
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Once the general framework of all commercial communications has been set by 
article 6 of the E-commerce Directive, article 7 of the Directive lays down the specific 
conditions that need to be fulfilled when the communications were neither solicited nor 
previously consented by the receiver. In addition to restating the same transparency 
requirement as to the commercial character of the communication, paragraph (a) of 
article 7 states that it is up to the Member States to allow or not unsolicited commercial 
communications by  electronic mail. Read in accordance with article 3(1) and 3(2) of the 
E-commerce Directive128 we could admit that paragraph (a) of article 7 could have as an 
effect a decrease in the amount of spam originating in a Member State that prohibits the 
unsolicited commercial communications by electronic mail. However, since the 
Commission views unsolicited commercial communications and spam as being 
synonyms129 and it admitted on several occasions that spam is an international issue and 
it can only be addressed through international measures, I foresee only a limited positive 
effect in allowing the Member States that space of manoeuvre.  
Article 7(2) of the E-Commerce Directive requires a much wider interpretation. 
The article states: 
“Without prejudice to Directive 97/7/EC and Directive 97/66/EC, 
Member States shall take measures to ensure that service providers 
undertaking unsolicited commercial communications by electronic 
mail consult regularly and respect the opt-out registers in which 
natural persons not wishing to receive such commercial 
communications can register themselves. 
A first comment needs to be made about the reference to the two directives, 
Directive 97/7/EC130 and Directive 97/66/EC, especially since the first one has been 
amended131 and the second132 has been repealed. 
                                                 
128 “Each Member State shall ensure that the information society services provided by a service provider 
established on its territory comply with the national provisions applicable in the Member State in question 
which fall within the coordinated field ” (article 3(1) of the E- Commerce Directive) 
     “Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide 
information society services from another Member State.” (article 3(2) of the E- Commerce Directive) 
129 see the discussion in the Introduction 
130 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts, available at:  
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/dist_sell/dist01_en.pdf  (last visited 21 July 
2005) 
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Of relevance here is the fact that Directive 97/7/EC (commonly referred to as 
the Distance Selling Directive) prohibits in article 10 only the commercial 
communications through facsimile and automatic calling machines where the consumer 
didn’t express his prior consent. Other means of distance communications (such as the e-
mail) can be used for commercial communications “where there is no clear objection 
from the consumer”. It is my understanding that it would be no restriction on e-mail 
marketing to a customer, website visitor or other Internet user who had not indicated 
clearly an opposition to receiving such information. But the onus would be on the 
Internet user to invoke the safeguard, as his consent is presumed until contrary is proven. 
One indication of a clear objection would be the user asking to be included in an opt – out 
registry, either in a general one (opting–out from any kind of commercial 
communications) or making use of the “unsubscribe link” provided in the end of the 
commercial message. Not respecting the consumer decision would make the legitimate 
direct marketer turn, according to a recent statement of the International Chamber of 
Commerce133, into a spammer: 
“Put simply, the entities that send spam differ from legitimate 
marketers because spammers do not respect applicable laws and 
regulations and do not honor users’ preferences regarding 
commercial communications. This is the essence of spam”.  
But what exactly is the scope of the service provider’s obligation according to 
article 7(2) of the E-commerce Directive? If they undertake unsolicited commercial 
communications, they have to “consult regularly and respect the opt-out registers” in 
which natural persons can register themselves. What would that mean in terms of 
frequency? “Regularly” does not equal with “systematic”. And does this imply they have 
to consult the registers prior to every mailing campaign? Does that entitle them to send 
                                                                                                                                                 
131 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market” amends the Directive 97/7/EC. 
However, the amendments do not affect the provisions on unsolicited commercial communications. 
132 DIRECTIVE 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_024/l_02419980130en00010008.pdf  (last visited 21 July 
2005) 
133 “ICC policy statement on 'spam' and unsolicited commercial electronic messages”, 2 December 2004, 
page 3  
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unsolicited commercial e-mails to corporate e-mail addresses (office@business.ro for 
example) without any restrictions? And which registers must they consult in case of a 
.com domain e-mail address? All the available ones134? Only some of the national opt-out 
registries? 
Another factor contributing to the unpredictability of the provisions of article 
7(2) is that Directive 97/66/EC has been repealed and replaced by the Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications135, implementing the “opt-in rule” in article 13 
(1) and the “soft opt–in rule” for pre-existing business relations between the unsolicited 
commercial communication service provider and a natural person136. These rules are 
formally the direct opposite of the “opt-out rule” in article 7(2), and according to article 
19 of the 2002/58/EC Directive: “References made to the repealed Directive shall be 
construed as being made to this Directive”. It is clear that article 7(2) of the E-commerce 
Directive refers now to the 2002 Privacy Directive, but how can two apparently 
conflicting provisions be reconciled? It appears that137 the two legal texts refer to 
different situations. By referring to “opt-out registers” the E-Commerce Directive 
introduces the right of ANY Internet user, European or non- European alike to opt-out of 
commercial communications coming from ANY European service provider, regardless of 
any previous links which may or may not exist between them, without requiring that the 
collecting party or the third party advertiser be informed as to the exercise of the right of 
objection.  
While it is true that the 2002 Privacy Directive forbids all commercial 
communications in the absence of a prior consent from the potential receiver, in that 
sense being an “opt-in” rule, the right to object to the collection of its e-mail for 
marketing purposes and to the transmission of commercial e-mails without consent138, 
according to article 14 (b) of the 95/46/EC Directive must be exercised against (and is 
expected to be offered by) the party who directly collected the e-mails. The right to object 
to the initial collector of  the personal data (the e-mail address ) covers not only the acts 
                                                 
134 opt –out registers are established at a national level, with some initiatives of setting some for the whole 
Europe or even in collaboration with the FTC in the US. 
135 DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC  
136 A more detailed analysis of the provisions in the 2002 Privacy Directive occurs in the following section   
137  Serge Gauthronet and Etienne Drouard (2001)   
138 which, as shown in the previous chapter can be regarded as a processing of personal data in the meaning 
of article 2 (b) of the 95/46/EC Directive 
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of the collector himself (“used for direct marketing purposes”), but also the acts of a third 
party who, following a disclosure of personal data by the initial collector, uses it for 
direct marketing purposes. 
 
 In order to sum up on the issue identified in the title of this section, we need to 
go again through the characteristics of spam, as classified in the introductory chapter of 
this thesis and explained in more detail in the first section of Chapter 1, and compare 
them with the requirements imposed by the e-commerce related legislation on all the 
unsolicited commercial communications, as identified above. 
1. the means to collect the e-mail addresses: The E-commerce Directive does 
not address directly the issue of the initial collection of the e-mail addresses. The only 
reference that we can find is included in Recital 14 of the Directive. Since the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data was already addressed by the 
95/46/EC Directive, and the 97/66/EC Directive (as mentioned before, this reference can 
now be construed as being made to the new 2002 Privacy Directive), the implementation 
and application of the E-commerce Directive “should be made in full compliance with the 
principles relating to the protection of personal data in particular as regards unsolicited 
commercial communications”. Since the opt-out rule, as opposed to the opt-in rule 
legitimises the first e-mail sent (as no clear opposition to its sending was yet manifested), 
it is not surprising that the focus from the businesses side is not the original collection of 
the e-mails.  
From the practical perspective, the service providers need a clear answer to the 
question: “How can I make myself known in the first place to the potential customer, 
without becoming a spammer, when I’m conducting activity exclusively on line?” You 
may be lucky enough for someone to simply find your site and then let all his friends now 
about it, but this won’t get you too far. The obvious temptation139 would be to use 
targeted e-mail marketing, using an already existing list of e-mails from a list broker. But 
for the reasons presented above, and due to the personal data protection rules (as detailed 
in Chapter 2), the technique is unacceptable and is a safe ride to winning a “spammer 
title”. One acceptable method as an initial contact to potential customers would be the 
                                                 
139 Serge Gauthronet and Etienne Drouard (2001), page 61 
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banner advertising on websites related to the advertiser’s products or services. By 
clicking on the banner, the interested party would thus be directed to the website in 
question and the advertiser could thus initiate the opt-in e- mail relationship with the 
visitor.   
2. the transmission practices. The E-commerce Directive imposes two 
obligations on the information society services providers, when they undergo unsolicited 
commercial communications through e-mail. First of all, to make sure that they make 
apparent the commercial character of the message transmitted. At the same time, they 
have to respect the clearly manifested opposition to receive this kind of unsolicited e-mail 
messages. Neither the E-commerce Directive not the Distance Selling Directive (that 
contains the same safeguard in article 10) do not impose on the service providers the 
obligation to include in the unsolicited commercial e-mails they send a link through 
which the receiver can object directly to the message transmitted( a functional, real 
unsubscribe link). As one reads the text of the E- commerce Directive, the service 
provider has to “consult regularly and respect” the opt-out REGISTERS in which natural 
persons CAN register themselves.  Since the scope of the service provider’s liability is 
limited to the consultation of the opt –out registers (if they exist, where they exist, since 
standards as to how accurate or comprehensive these registers should be were not 
created), it is the responsibility of the individual to make sure that his e-mail address is 
listed in this registry. Objecting to receiving commercial e-mails turns into an expensive, 
time consuming chore, and only the unscrupulous spammers stand to gain from the 
uncertainties. At the same time, no obligations to sending commercial e-mails to legal 
person addresses were included. Does that make spamming these addresses less 
detrimental to legal entities and more justifiable?  
3. the content. This is, in my opinion, one of the aspects the best addressed in 
the e-commerce related European legislation, making the deceiving advertising contents 
used by spammers clearly illegal ( see annex 2, example 2 for illustration purposes) . I’m 
not referring here to the general E-commerce Directive but to the ‘Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive’140, as well as to the Directive 84/450/EEC (as amended by Directive 
                                                 
140 Directive 2005/29/EC  
 46
97/55/EC )141stating the conditions to be fulfilled by an advertising message. There are 
also more specific Directives stating the requirements for advertising products like 
tobacco142 or medicines143. To go into more details about these Directives would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis and would not serve its aim. 
4. the position of the receiver with regard to the unsolicited communication 
received. Spam messages are unwanted, unsolicited and unstoppable, as discussed 
previously. The E-commerce Directive tackles these features not by prohibiting the 
marketers to send unsolicited commercial messages (advertising e-mail messages that 
haven’t been asked beforehand by the receiver) but by making sure that unsolicited e-
mails are not sent to natural persons that have clearly manifested their wish not to receive 
such content in their Inbox. The Directive does not deal with the issue of whether or not 
the unsolicited mail is still of interest to the receiver (unsolicited but wanted as opposed 
to unsolicited and unwanted, a typical situation of spam).  
I can conclude on the issue by saying that the receiver has, following the E-
Commerce Directive, the possibility to do an “ex-post control”, by saying NO and 
stopping the flood of unsolicited commercial e-mails in his Inbox. This is, as we shall see 
in the following chapter, a different type of involvement then the one intrinsic to the opt-
in rule, where the individual is ( or it’s supposed to be) the initiator of the commercial 
communication process, as he said YES to receiving commercial communications that 
can be included within his field of interest. 
 
 
Section 2: The data protection legislative response to spam practices  
Two types of provisions can be said to aim, among others, at reducing and even 
stopping the spam practices: on the one hand there are the general data protection rules, 
establishing the legal practices as well as the safeguards available for natural and legal 
                                                 
141 Directive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending 
Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising (OJ L 
290, 23.10.1997, p. 18) 
142 Directive 98/43/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products 
143 Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the advertising of medicinal products for human use . 
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persons against the illegal collection, use and third party disclosure of personal data144. 
On the other hand, article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive and the related Recitals 
establish a special regime for the personal data processing occurring in the context of 
unsolicited communications for direct marketing. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I 
will focus on the latter provisions, whereas the general regime will serve as comparative 
element, when and if the special regime derogates from the general rules.  
 
Subsection 1: Principles and rules regarding the COLLECTION of e-mail 
addresses 
Although the term “electronic mail” has been given a broad and technologically 
neuter interpretation, both in the 2002 Privacy Directive itself145 and in the Data 
Protection Working Party Opinion146, due to the scope of this thesis I will only consider 
some issues raised by the classic e-mail (SMTP147 based) spam. 
The current regime148 of personal data protection, when the purpose of the data 
collection is direct marketing, distinguishes between the protection awarded to natural 
persons (article 13 (1) and (3)) and the one awarded to legal persons (article 13 (4) ). The 
difference in regime is quite significant, so I will structure my discourse based on this 
distinction:  
1.1. COLLECTION  OF E-MAIL ADDRESSES BELONGING TO 
NATURAL PERSONS:  
The rule in article 13 (1) provides among others, that the e-mail addresses 
belonging to natural persons can only be collected for marketing purposes if the 
subscribers have given their prior consent. At the same time, according to article 13(2), 
during existing customer relations, a business can use the e-mail addresses collected from 
its clients in order to market its own products (with the limitations that will be discussed 
below)   
                                                 
144 See Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC.  
145 article 2 (h) read in accordance with Recitals 4 and 40 of the 2002/58/EC Directive.  
146 Opinion 5/2004 on unsolicited communications for marketing purposes under article 13 of Directive 
2002/58/EC, 11601/EN WP90 specifies at point 3.1 that “any message by electronic communications 
where the simultaneous participation of the sender and the recipient is not required” can be included in the 
concept of electronic mail. 
147 Simple Mail Transport Protocol. 
148 introduced through the 2002 Privacy Directive. 
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1.1.1 opt-in rule Despite the fact that the rule allowing the processing149 
of personal data only when the data subject has “unambiguously given his consent”150 
has governed the practice of data processors in Europe since the implementation of the 
95/46/EC Directive, its express adoption for this particular type of data processing met 
the sustained opposition from the direct marketing associations151. Article 13(1) of the 
2002/58/EC Directive read in accordance with article 2(f) of the same Directive extends 
the existing meaning of consent152 to the processing done in the context of direct 
marketing. That means that any commercial communication done in the absence of the 
prior, freely given, specific and informed consent of the e-mail address owner is deemed 
to be unsolicited and thus prohibited. From the point of view of the attempts to stop spam 
(and assuming for the moment that spammers really do care about the legal provisions) 
this provision arguably153 goes directly to the “root of all evil”: the illegitimate collection 
of e-mail addresses, and their subsequent use for unsolicited bulk, commercial emails. It 
prohibits the first e-mail sent without the proper consent154 and it moves the burden of 
proof on the business party, which has to show that it has requested and received the 
                                                 
149 according to article 2 (b) of the Directive 95/46/EC, processing of personal data includes, among other,  
acts of collection, use, disclosure by transmission 
150 according to article 7 (a) of the Directive 95/46/EC, considering that none of the other criteria in article 
7 could apply to the processing of e-mail addresses in the context of spam 
151  see FEDMA comments regarding the Working Document on the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communication sector, 18 may 2000,  claiming that article 13 and the 
opt-in rule represents a “radical and non-justified solution” ; document  available at: 
 http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/nrfwd/FEDMA22e.htm (last visited 2005-08-
01) 
Also the comments of the DMA in UK, claiming article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive “would create an 
insuperable barrier to the effective development of electronic commerce thereby preventing the creation of 
a true single market which would allow EU citizens wide access to the fullest range of goods and services” 
see “The Direct Marketing Association (UK)'s comments on the Working Document on the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communication sector”, available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/nrfwd/DMA22e.htm  (last visited 2005-08-01) 
152 art 2(h)of Directive 95/46/EC defines consent as “any freely given specific and informed indication of 
his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed” 
153 it has been claimed that spammers do not care about the legal provisions, whatever they are, and that the 
studies indicate that the majority of spam comes from outside Europe and will not be subjected to the opt-in 
rule anyway. See for reference the FEDMA document quoted above. 
154 see however  the Belgian  law implementing the Directive, available at  
http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_a.pl?language=fr&caller=list&cn=2003031132&la=f&fromtab=loi&sql=
dt='loi'&tri=dd+as+rank&rech=1&numero=1 , whose article 14(1) was interpreted as permitting the 
business party to send a first e-mail in which they ask for the e-mail owner’s consent to the sending of 
commercial communications at that address.  The requirements that this first prospective e-mail should 
fulfil can be found at : “FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy – Belgium « Spamming » 24 
questions & answers” – January 2005, page 10.  
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private individual’s consent. This opposed to the previous opt-out regime, which, as 
shown in Chapter one, left the end-user with the responsibility to make the 
communications stop.   
The rule seems, in theory, to be pretty clear. However, the law has to be tailored 
on social realities and in practice it is more difficult to keep the balance between the 
legitimate interests of direct marketers (affected as well by the opt-in regime155) and the 
privacy concerns of the individuals. Most discussions revolve around the quality of the 
consent that would provide adequate level of control to the individuals over the use of 
personal information, while allowing marketers to get as many “opt-ins” as needed for 
efficient business operations. First of all, the Data Protection Working Party explicitly 
stated that the “ e-mail addresses picked up in public areas of the Internet156 such as news 
groups without the informed knowledge of the individual are not lawfully collected. They 
can thus not be used for any purpose than the one for which they have been made public, 
in particular not for direct marketing”157. Similarly, the implied consent, the use of pre-
checked boxes, and broad general requests for consent would not meet the requirements 
of the Directive with respect to transparency and fairness158. However, as stated by 
Recital 17 of the 2002 Privacy Directive, ticking a box when visiting an Internet website 
is an appropriate method of expressing consent.  
In my view, the most important requirement for obtaining the user’s consent is 
that it has to be an INFORMED indication of the user’s wishes. Although I fully realize 
that a marketer cannot be expected to negotiate individually every user’s declaration of 
will, I believe that the exact wording of the text accompanying the box to be ticked 
makes the difference between an informed consent as opposed to a speculative, “semi-
informed” one159. The consequence of this distinction is, for the purposes of the current 
                                                 
155 the direct marketers face one additional limit to the legal ways in which they can approach prospective 
clients for the first time 
156 which, as I have pointed out in the first chapter, are the main target of the spammers when looking for e-
mail addresses  
157 Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements for collecting personal data on-line in the 
European Union, 5020/01/EN/ Final, WP 43 
158 DPWP (2000), 5063/00/EN/FINAL Chapter 4, §V; Chapter 8, §4. 
159 An extremely interesting experiment was conducted on the issue by George R. Milne in 1997. Among 
the conclusions of this study (see the article for concrete examples of opt-in statements) was that the 
“format of the question asking customers to join a mailing list can affect their willingness to transfer 
personal information. The direct yes or no format question that asked consumers to join a mailing list 
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discussion, that even if a certain procedure of information has been followed by the 
marketer, the individual might experience the same lost of control over the personal 
information as in the context of spam.  
1.1.2  Soft opt -in rule, introduced by article 13(2) of the 2002 Privacy 
Directive is, regards more the “use of e-mail addresses ” than the “ e-mail addresses 
collection”. Moreover, it applies both to natural and legal person’s e-mail addresses, so I 
will discuss it in more detail in Subsection 2. What is worth saying at this point, is that 
the soft opt- in rule was interpreted as allowing the marketers to use further customer lists 
that were compiled before 31 October 2003160, in accordance with the previous opt-out 
regime161, as long as they have been used recently and the subscribers are given, with 
every new message sent, the opportunity to object to further use of their addresses162. 
1.2. COLLECTION OF E-MAIL ADDRESSES BELONGING TO LEGAL 
PERSONS:  
According to article 13(5) of the 2002 Privacy Directive, the Member States are 
supposed to make sure that the legitimate interests of the subscribers163 other than natural 
persons are “sufficiently protected”164 with regard to unsolicited commercial 
communications. In other words, the Member States can chose to impose on the 
marketers collecting and using e-mail addresses belonging to legal persons either the opt-
in or the opt-out regime, or any other level of protection they might consider fit “in the 
framework of Community law and applicable national legislation”. The solution was a 
compromise one, meant to alleviate the concern of marketers that the data protection laws 
might restrict the content of communications exchanged within business- to- business 
relations thus exceeding its ambit. Since the basic difference between legitimate e-mail 
marketers and spammers is that the first ones are compliant with the existing legislation 
                                                                                                                                                 
caused the consumers to be more protective with their names. Yes/no caused consumers to process the 
information more carefully on the 1st question and this heightened the level of cognitive activity thus 
forcing a more intense scrutiny on the transfer question”.  
160 the deadline for the transposition of the 2002 Privacy Directive in national laws, according to article 17 
of the Directive 
161 used in accordance with Directive 97/66/EC, repealed according to article 19 of the  2002 Privacy 
Directive 
162 see  http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/ico_guidance_dpec_part2.pdf  
163 see Recital 12 of the 2002 Privacy Directive for a clarification of the term “subscriber”  
164 The issue of what are those interests and why do they justify a different standard of protection than the 
natural persons, as well as the issue of how “sufficiently protected” are the natural persons following the 
provisions in article 13 (4) will be addressed in Section 3 
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and pay special attention to consumers’ wishes, expressing in very clear terms the 
permitted behaviour was essential for the e-mail marketer’s activity. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of the common fight against spam, the effect of this freedom of 
decision awarded to the states can only be detrimental.  
Four examples will serve my purpose of illustrating how different the national 
implementation of the Directive can be: 
Due to the provisions of article 19 (3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 165, in 
Germany the same level of protection was awarded to both natural and corporate e-mail 
addresses. 
In Great Britain166, the term “individual subscriber” was interpreted broadly so 
as to include not only natural persons, but also “unincorporated partnerships and sole 
traders”, in the first case because the unincorporated partnership is not a legal person, in 
the second case since the legal and the natural person coincide. In other words, it is 
forbidden to send commercial e-mails in the absence of informed and specific prior 
consent not only to e-mail addresses belonging to natural persons, but also to business e-
mail addresses in the two mentioned situations.  
In Belgium167, it is possible to send unsolicited commercial communications to 
addresses like info@company.be or customer.services@company.be or contact@... 
office@..., as long as, according to the circumstances, it is obvious that they belong to a 
legal person.168. Contrarily, once a company creates to its employee business addresses 
like name.surname@company.be , the address is to be considered as belonging to a 
natural person, despite its use for business related communications. It is the marketer’s 
responsibility to appreciate in each case, before sending the commercial e-mails, what 
kind of address (belonging to a natural or a legal person) is the one targeted, and the 
evidentiary burden (with regard to applicability of this exception) rests on him.  One 
                                                 
165 http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/recht/de/bdsg/summary-gutachten.pdf , page 2, (last visited, August 1, 
2005)  
166 see further, 
 http://ico-cms.amaze.co.uk/DocumentUploads/New%20rules%20on%20email%20marketing.pdf
 (last visited, August 1, 2005)  
167 According to the “Arrêté royal visant à réglementer l’envoi de publicités par courrier électronique”, 
4.04.2003, published in the MONITEUR BELGE- BELGISCH STAATSBLAD on 28.05.2003, page 
29292” http://www.iab-belgium.be/Media/pdf/kb040403.pdf  (last visited, August 1, 2005) 
168 “Des publicités non sollicitées par courrier électronique peuvent être envoyées à ces adresses, dans la 
mesure où, en raison des circonstances, il est manifeste que ces adresses concernent des personnes morales” 
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additional and essential condition is that a marketer is not allowed to send unsolicited 
commercial communications to legal persons in order to advertise products and services 
addressed actually to natural persons169. 
The fourth and the last example is the French approach. In its initial 
interpretation, the law of 21 June 2004170  stated that the prior consent rule applied to 
addresses such as name.surname@company.fr ( nominative professional e-mail 
addresses) but did not apply to addresses from which the identity of the person could not 
be inferred, such as office@company.fr . 
Following negotiations between the CNIL and the representatives of the direct 
marketers in France, in a decision in 17th of February 2005, CNIL reconsidered its 
position on the issue171, ruling that natural persons can receive commercial e-mails 
without their prior consent on their nominative professional e-mail addresses if these 
unsolicited e-mails are related to the function they fulfil within the company172. In other 
words, the director of informatics systems within a company can receive “special offers” 
for hardware on its nominative business e-mail address, but not offers for summer 
vacations on some exotic islands. 
As it is obvious from the examples presented above, the different national 
transpositions of the Directive leads to a fragmented and inefficient approach to spam and 
creates additional difficulties for the direct marketers that have to figure out what is the 
permitted behaviour in every jurisdiction. Neither the Directive itself, nor the 2004 
Opinion of the Data Protection Working Party specify the level of diligence that can be 
expected from the marketers in getting to know the applicable regime and the type of 
address that he is prospecting.  
                                                 
169 “En outre, les produits ou services offerts à travers les publicités ainsi envoyées doivent viser des 
personnes morales, et non des personnes physiques. En effet, un annonceur ne saurait se prévaloir de 
l’exception pour envoyer à des adresses de personnes morales des publicités visant en réalité des personnes 
physiques, contournant ainsi l’obligation de solliciter le consentement préalable de ces dernières” 
170 Loi pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique (article L 34-5  du code des postes et 
télécommunications, available at:  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnArticleDeCode?commun=CPOSTE&art=L34-5 (last visited, 
August 1, 2005). 
171 the decision is available on 
http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1780&print=&news[uid]=238&cHash=afcf8a5adf   (last visited, August 
1, 2005). 
172 les personnes physiques puissent être prospectées sans leur accord préalable à leur adresse électronique 
professionnelle, «au titre de la fonction dans l'organisme (…) que leur a attribué cette adresse. 
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 In any event, both legal and natural persons must be offered the general 
possibility to object easily and free of charge to having their address collected for direct 
marketing communications, both at the time of collection, and subsequently, on the 
occasion of each message sent in case the customer had not refused initially such use. 
Moreover, similarly to the obligation imposed on the service providers in the E-
Commerce Directive, it is prohibited to send commercial e-mails “disguising or 
concealing the identity of the sender on whose behalf the communication is made, or 
without a valid address to which the recipient may send a request that such 
communications cease” (art 13 (4) of the 2002 Privacy Directive. The very common 
spam practice is obviously targeted here. 
 
Subsection 2: Principles and rules regarding the USE of personal data FOR 
DIRECT MARKETING PURPOSES;  
The obligations of the direct marketers with regard to the use of individual e-
mail addresses for commercial communications depend on the manner in which the 
addresses were initially collected and whether or not a business relationship was 
previously established between them. Some of the applicable rules were already 
mentioned, so they don’t require further analysis. These rules regard the prohibition to 
use e-mail addresses that were illegally collected and the obligation to give the 
opportunity to object to any further use of the e-mail address for commercial 
communications with every such communication sent, even though the initial collection 
was agreed to.  
Two issues will be discussed in this section:  
2.1 The use of e-mail addresses for direct marketing purposes within an existing 
customer relationship (sending unsolicited commercial e-mails to current or former 
clients) 
Once the client’s contact details have been obtained by the marketer “in the 
context of a sale”, the same marketer can use the personal data in order to “market its 
own similar products and services”. Of course the general requirement regarding the right 
to object applies here too. Although the provisions of article 13 (2) of the 2002 Privacy 
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Directive have been interpreted by the Data Protection Working Party173 , the comments 
leave as well much room for interpretation by the Member States.  
The wording “in the context of a sale” was interpreted sometimes as not being 
limited to completed sales, but also to its preceding stages, for example when a customer 
shows interest in the products and services of a company, and does not object to receiving 
further communications relating to the same or similar items, but without buying any .174 
In other interpretations, at least one contractual direct link between the marketer and the 
e-mail address owner it is necessary to have been established175. However, the Working 
Party raises the question on the period of time during which the consent is to be 
reasonably considered to be valid. In my opinion, if we call the applicability of the 
general principles applicable, and give within every communication the option to opt-out 
from receiving further commercial messages from the same source, we do not need to 
decide on a time frame in which the consent is validly given, as it is reinforced after 
every communication. A more interesting question relating to the temporal validity of the 
consent is raised when a relatively large time interval has passed between the moment of 
collection and the moment when the first unsolicited communication is sent. This 
question, however is strictly linked to the nature of the offer, and cannot be answered a 
priori. 
Therefore, the client relations with the mother company would not entitle a 
daughter company to send unsolicited commercial e-mails to the client, even for similar 
products and services. In this case, the daughter company, as well as any partner or 
company belonging to the same group of companies, are considered separate legal 
entities, and they are not therefore covered by the term “its own similar products and 
services”. 
Thirdly, the concept of “similar products and services” received different, even 
contradictory interpretations. According to the Data Protection Working Party, the 
similarity will have to be interpreted according to the objective perspective (that is 
                                                 
173 See DPWP, Opinion 5/2004, op.cit. 
174 see  http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry_files/pdf/ico_guidance_dpec_part2.pdf , pp. 24. 
175 “In practice a provider may legally sent his catalogue of products and services by electronic mail to all 
clients having subscribed at least once to one of these products or services (asking for specifications is not 
sufficient to fulfill the condition), and having communicated their particulars on that occasion” see the 
Belgian interpretation, in FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy – Belgium « Spamming » 24 
questions & answers” – January 2005 and footnote 152. 
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according to the reasonable expectations) of the recipient, and not from the perspective of 
the sender176. For example, if I buy Milan Kundera’s book “ The Joke” from an on-line 
bookshop, and do not object to receiving further offers from the same shop, can the 
marketer be entitled to assume that I reasonably expect to receive special offers on all the 
books available, all Kundera’s books, all the fiction books about communism?  
According to the interpretation given to the Directive in the Belgian Law, similar 
products and services are considered the ones belonging to the same category of products 
and services177, that is, according to the current stage of the technological development ( 
so we see here a completely different criteria than the one presented by the Data 
Protection Working Party), the CDs, the DVDs, the video cassettes and even the books 
belong to the same group of products and services, so they are similar. Again, the 
wording chosen by the marketer when asking for the consent of the customer is extremely 
relevant as a factor against which the reasonable expectations of the person could be 
examined. 
The discussion about similarity, especially since the proposed European criteria 
refers to the reasonable expectations of the recipient could be very extensive. But since 
I’m focusing on the legislative response to the spam with the view of protecting the 
privacy interests of the natural persons that become victim of spam attacks and suffer its 
negative consequences, it is not relevant to go into more details on the point. A marketing 
study made in 2000 by Susan Chang, Mariko Morimoto178 pointed out, referring also to 
previous studies that the customers did not consider unsolicited messages coming from 
companies with whom they have done business in the past to be SPAM179.  
The fact that they had built already a relation with a company in the past made 
the individuals feel less annoyed when they received other offers from the same 
company. Although rules had to be set in order to prevent the marketers abuse an existing 
customer relation, I believe that as long as the marketers keep their commercial 
                                                 
176 see the DPWP Opinion nr 5/2004, page 9  
177 “Sont considérés comme produits ou services analogues ceux qui appartiennent à une même catégorie 
de produits ou de services”, see “Arrêté royal visant à réglementer l’envoi de publicités par courrier 
électronique” (2003) 
178 Chang, Morimoto (2003), op.cit. 
179 idem, pp. 9 
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communications at a reasonable level, they will not be accused by their existing clients of 
spam.   
 
2.2 The use of e-mail addresses that were not collected directly from their 
authorised user. This issue is not directly addressed by article 13 of the 2002 Privacy 
Directive. However, the rules applicable according to the data protection legislation have 
an obvious applicability, since the spammers collect e-mail addresses into lists and sell 
them to third parties, or use themselves existing lists which they bought from other list 
brokers.  
The rules that govern the transfer of personal data (and in our case, the transfer 
of a natural or legal person’s e-mail addresses) will be dealt with in the next subsection. 
The issue in discussion here is whether or not the marketers buying or renting the e-mail 
lists from a third party to whom they were consensually given have any duties to check if 
the consent was legally obtained for all the e-mails in the lists or to inform the persons 
about the purpose for which they intend to use their e-mail addresses (and, if applicable, 
ask again for prior consent). Although it is probably recommended to have such a 
preventive behaviour, are the marketers, as data controllers compelled to do so? 
As stated, the 2002 Privacy Directive deals only with the obligations of the 
party collecting e-mail addresses with the intent to share/ sell/ rent the lists to a third 
party. Once the e-mail owner has given his informed prior consent to the collection for 
this purpose, the third party to whom they are entrusted can use them for the same 
purpose (direct marketing). The idea is present also in Recital 39 of the 2002 Privacy 
Directive and is in accordance with the purpose specification principle. But article 11 of 
the 95/46/EC Directive would be applicable also, first because the data has not been 
obtained by the current controller directly from the data subject (but indirectly from the 
party to whom they have been entrusted), and secondly because the application of the 
general data protection principles is in accordance with article 1(2) of the 2002 Privacy 
Directive. Therefore, “at the time of undertaking the recording of personal data”, or at the 
time of the first disclosure, the data subject should be informed about the identity of the 
controller, the purposes of the processing, and about any other issues that, according to 
the principles of fair processing, are considered as necessary.  In my opinion, according 
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to the obligations stated already in article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive, all these 
information become available to the e-mail address owner at the time the first unsolicited 
commercial e-mail is send by the new  data controller. However, if the list of addresses 
was compiled during the previous opt-out regime, the new controller might find himself 
accused of spam, with all the associated negative consequences for his business. 
 
Subsection 3: Principles and rules regarding the TRANSFER of personal 
data to third parties 
The marketing research literature has explored extensively the impact of the 
individual’s privacy concerns on their on-line behaviour and on the trust they are willing 
to award to the marketers with which they interact. According to Kim Bartel Sheehan and 
Mariea Grubbs Hoy180 , prior studies seem to indicate that “two expressions of control, 
awareness of information collection and usage beyond original transactions are the 
predominant influences on the degree to which consumers experience privacy concern.” 
The consumer’s concerns are justified, considering they only become aware of the 
secondary use of the personal information ex-post, when they receive unsolicited and 
unwanted communications from parties to whom their data has been transferred.  
The data protection core principles, especially the principles of disclosure 
limitation and purpose specification181, minimality182 as well as data subject participation 
and control183 oppose, among others, to the disclosure of personal data to a third party 
without the data subject’s prior consent. The definition of consent, in itself contains the 
requirement that a separate and specific manifestation of will has to be obtained from the 
data subject in case the marketer wishes to disclose customer data to other third parties. 
This requirement is founded on the desire to empower the individual with the 
ability to control the identity of the entity managing his personal data (in this case, its e-
mail address) and the purposes of the processing done upon them. From the individual’s 
perspective however, the theoretical ability to exercise control is limited due to 
asymmetrical information:  
                                                 
180 Sheehan & Hoy (2000), op.cit., pp. 63. 
181 article 6(b) of the 95/46/EC Directive. 
182 article 6(c) of the 95/46/EC Directive. 
183 article 12 (a), first stance, in the 95/46/EC Directive 
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“Asymmetrical information refers to the imperfect knowledge or 
information that consumers may have about a product, the company 
that made the product, alternative products, and so on when they 
enter the marketplace (…) Applied to our privacy context, 
individuals would need to have fairly detailed information about the 
behavior of businesses and the value of their personal information to 
their operations to determine how their information will be handled 
and what commercial value it may possess”184
Moreover, according to a marketing study185, consumers will be less willing to 
provide permission to transfer their name when the financial gain to the marketer is 
explicit and the third party selectivity is absent. Question format and disclosure 
statements affected significantly the response levels: 
“In particular, both revealing the actual practice of renting names, 
and not informing customers of the type of third party that might 
receive transferred names lowered the customer’s willingness to 
transfer personal information. These results might help explain the 
accepted practice of direct marketers that use euphemistic 
expressions and try to assure customers that their names are sold 
only to responsible parties that have goods and services of interest to 
the consumer” 186  
Take for example the following statement: “Occasionally we make a portion of 
our mailing lists available to a few, reputable, carefully screened companies whose 
products you might find of interest.” Or, a similar statement: “We occasionally exchange 
our customer lists with other reputable companies whose products and services we 
believe might be of interest to our clients”. In both cases, the client is given the option to 
tick a box in which he consents to the actions specified in the statements. The marketer’s 
intention is obvious and prior consent has been obtained. According to the study above, 
there are high chances these statements will produce a high positive response rate. 
                                                 
184 Ann Cavoukian (1999), op.cit. page 15 
185 see George R.Milne (1997), op.cit. page 301 
186 idem, page 304 
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But can we truly say the consumer is giving a fully informed and specific 
consent? 
Section 3: The efficiency of the anti-spam solution provided by the 
European legislator 
 
The investigation will, inevitably be centred on the spam issues identified in the 
previous two sections. For the purposes of the analysis I adopted a broad interpretation of 
the term “efficiency”, including not only an evaluation of the costs of enforcing the 
system vs. the practical results achieved, but also a balance of the practical results vs. the 
basic aims of the legal framework; the latter evaluation might be otherwise included 
under the term “effectiveness”. Therefore, we also need to look into the equilibrium that 
can be inferred from the legal text, in as much as some of the interests of the different 
actors (direct marketers, end-users) modelling their behaviour in accordance with the 
chosen normative texts187, might conflict.  
In essence, I will try to provide a possible answer to three questions: 
1. Do the different mechanisms provided by the E-commerce Directive, on the 
one hand, and Privacy and Data Protection European Directives on the other converge 
towards a unitary solution or do they clash? 
2. Is this solution (Or are the two mechanisms) fit for the purpose it (they) 
aim(s) at? 
3. Are there negative consequences arising from this regulatory approach and if 
the answer is affirmative, do they exceed the positive consequences? 
 
Subsection 1 Different mechanisms –one solution? 
Comparing the provisions of the E-commerce Directive (articles 6 and 7) with 
the provisions of the 2002 Privacy Directive (mainly article 13), the first point that 
becomes obvious is that they employ different mechanisms in the fight against spam, and 
therefore establish different duties for the marketers that wish to interact with potential 
customers through e-mail commercial messages and to send unsolicited messages. While 
                                                 
187 that is, the provisions referring to unsolicited commercial communications in the E-commerce and 
Privacy and Data Protection European Directives 
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the first one leaves it up to the Member States to permit or to forbid unsolicited 
commercial communications through e-mail and imposes on the marketers a mandatory 
consultation of the opt-out registers in which natural person might register themselves, 
the 2002 Privacy Directive divides the obligations of the marketers depending on the 
legal personality of the receiver (natural or legal person): an opt-in mechanism for natural 
persons, and a different regime, as chosen by the Member States, for legal persons. As 
hybrid between the opt-in and the opt-out regime, the rule commonly referred to as soft 
opt-in, distinguishes further between the type of relations that exist between the marketer 
and the prospected customer. 
 Therefore, the dilemma of a marketer conducting businesses on line and 
wishing to start a targeted advertising campaign through e-mail, consists first of all in 
determining which of the two directives to follow so as not to suffer the consequences 
arisen from being labelled a spammer. Both Directives are still in force, so their 
provisions are applicable, and other than the temporal primacy of the Privacy Directive 
(more recent compared to the E-commerce one), no subordination of one towards the 
other can be expressly established from reading their provisions. Following the E-
Commerce Directive, a marketer will be bound to the jurisdiction that applies to him188 , 
with the associated controversies regarding the meaning of the phrase “established on its 
territory” and the associated risks of forum shopping.  
Secondly, a marketer should “regularly” check for the opt-out registers in which 
the natural persons can register their wish not to receive more advertisements via e-mail. 
Several points are questionable here.  The main one relates to how thorough is this 
control expected to be? The legislator chose regularity as a criteria, but as showed in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, a check-up scheduled every six months according to self 
determined rules of practice and followed by the marketer is just as “regular” as a check-
up done before every marketing campaign, although they are the expression of different 
levels of diligence from the marketer. Since the expected outcome of this safeguard is to 
make sure the wishes of the customer are respected, what is truly relevant here is neither 
the time frequency not the pattern-like occurrence, but the “bona fides” behaviour of the 
marketer in making sure that his commercial message does not conflict with an express 
                                                 
188 according to article 3(1) of the E-Commerce Directive 
 61
wish of the customer. An additional point connected to the level of diligence expected 
from a marketer (and intrinsically reflecting the etiquette-related dividing line between 
spammers and marketers) questions the timeliness of an opt-out manifestation of will. 
Does a refusal to receive commercial communications registered six months before still 
reflects the wishes of the client at the moment? If the economic behaviour of a legal 
person is arguably more rational and thus more predictable, individuals are driven by a 
multitude of objective and subjective factors that are close to impossible to predict in an 
on-line internationally open market, even through assessing past behaviours and through 
profiling. Of course, the practicalities of choosing the appropriate register to check should 
not be ignored. 
Reflecting the above analyzed preoccupation for gaining and enforcing 
consumer confidence in e-mail marketing, the E-commerce Directive imposes 
transparency obligations on the marketer, regarding both the commercial character of the 
e-mails and the identity of the business sending them, as well as obligations on the 
Member States regarding the empowerment of the customer through the recognition of 
his free will and the actual opportunity to request the termination of commercial 
communications by subscribing to an opt-out list. Bear in mind however that these 
registers ought to be set only for natural persons that object to receiving such contents in 
their inbox. Although by looking at the definitions provided by articles 2(b) and 2(d) I 
can argue that the Directive deals also with business –to – business relations189, it can be 
inferred from the rules in article 6 and 7 (or better yet, from the absence of any of such 
rules), that there are few restrictions to sending unsolicited commercial communications 
to e-mail addresses belonging to legal persons.  
Having presented the E-commerce Directive mechanism addressing the 
unsolicited communications190, I will direct my attention to the relevant provisions of the 
2002 Privacy Directive.  
                                                 
189 the Directive defines in article 2(b) the term "service provider" as any natural or legal person providing 
an information society service and in article 2(d) the term "recipient of the service": any natural or legal 
person who, for professional ends or otherwise, uses an information society service, in particular for the 
purposes of seeking information or making it accessible”. 
190 and reference should be made to Section 1 for the more detailed analysis  of its provisions. 
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The new191 rules192 regarding unsolicited commercial e-mails make a basic 
distinction between the commercial e-mails sent to natural persons and the commercial e-
mails sent to legal persons.  
The first rule requires that the prior and informed consent of the natural person 
targeted (article 13.1) before the sending of the first message and a separate consent 
needs to be obtained for any secondary uses of the e-mail address obtained193. The 
natural person should also be given the possibility to stop at any point in time, free of 
charge and in an easy manner, further commercial communications. 
The second rule concerns “subscribers other than the natural persons” (article 
13.4) whose “legitimate interests” have to be sufficiently protected in this respect 
(unsolicited commercial communications). The provision is rather broad and unclear, 
since no further guidance is provided on relevant issues such as: what legitimate interests 
are being referred to in the context, what are the criteria that serve in the assessment of 
the “sufficiency” of protection, whether or not unincorporated companies, or structures 
without legal personality (such as daughter companies or virtual organizations), as well 
as sole traders should be included under the umbrella of “subscribers other than the 
natural persons” Ad litteram they should, as these entities are not and do not accomplish 
the functions on a natural person, but as showed previously194 the Member States have 
found different solutions to steer clear of the ambiguities in the European text. 
The third rule in the 2002 Privacy Directive (article 13.2) deals with existing 
business relations, involving both natural and legal person subscribers. Basically, 
marketers that obtained the e-mail addresses from their customers can continue to use 
them for sending commercial e-mails advertising their own similar products and services. 
Similar safeguards regarding the possibility for the customer to object to the 
communication should also be provided. 
This short description of the two mechanisms introduced by the European 
legislator as a legal tool to shield the Member States in the fight against spam already 
                                                 
191 the former Privacy in Telecommunications Directive (97/66/EC) had in art. 12 opt-out rules for 
unsolicited commercial e-mails, similar to the ones in the E-Commerce Directive 
192 refer to Section 3 of Chapter 2 in this thesis for a detailed description of the provisions in article 13 of 
the 2002 Privacy Directive and the definition of the key terms used therein. 
193 such as selling or renting the e-mail address to a third party. 
194 See Chapter 2, Section 3 Subsection 1.2 of this thesis. 
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highlighted some of the discrepancies. My goal is to explore the possibility for them to 
aggregate into a unitary solution, if this possibility exists, or to underline the 
contradictions that prevent them to become such unity. 
The two mechanisms have certain features in common:  
First of all, they both use the term “unsolicited communications”, and expressly 
(E-commerce Directive) or implicitly (2002 Privacy Directive) refer in terms of the 
content only to the commercial communications. As such, they regulate a larger sphere of 
behaviours that if they would have to address only spam and not legitimate e-mail 
marketing as well. At the same time, only part of the content commonly associated with 
spam is covered, since as I mentioned in the introductory chapter, spam e-mail messages 
are only in part commercial in nature, but can include political, religious, humanitarian 
and illegal material (viruses, child pornography).  
Secondly, they both outlaw the sending of commercial e-mail messages when 
the identity of the sender or of the person on whose behalf the sending is done is hidden 
or disguised (article 6 (b) of the E-Commerce Directive and article 13(4) of the 2002 
Privacy Directive). Both the interest in gaining client confidence and the privacy interest 
on having insight on the identity of the data processor justify and are well served by this 
requirement. 
Thirdly, they both reveal the need to look after the manifested wishes of the 
potential receiver, although the manner of expression and the role of such manifestation 
differs. 
Somehow surprisingly, this is about all the two legal texts have in common. The 
rest of the provisions, when they are faced one against the other, reveal either cross 
references or contradictions.  
The first cross reference is again related to the terminology used in the two 
directives. The E-commerce Directive contains in article 2(f) the definition of 
“commercial communications” and it seems that although the 2002 Privacy Directive 
does not expressly refer to the E-commerce Directive, it uses the term alike. The same 
can be said about the term “direct marketing” used by the Privacy Directive in both the 
text of article 13 and in the related Recitals (41, 42, 43, 45). Although the Recitals 
mention some of the features of the direct marketing, such as the low costs involved in 
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sending them (40), some media through which the direct marketing message can be 
conveyed, no definition is provided.  
The second cross reference concerns the level of protection awarded to legal 
persons. A partial reference is made in Recital 45 of the 2002 Privacy Directive, to those 
States that would chose to set up an opt-out register for legal persons, that they should 
apply the provisions in article 7 of the E-Commerce Directive. Again, the terminological 
reference is misleading, since the scope of the terms “legal person” (Recital 45) and 
“recipients other than natural persons”(article 13(4)) is different.   
The broadest cross reference between the two texts is to be found in article 7 of 
the E-Commerce Directive, stating that the provisions found in the E-Commerce 
Directive are “without prejudice to Directive 97/7/EC and Directive 97/66/EC”. This is 
an indirect reference to the 2002 Privacy Directive, as it mentions the former Privacy 
Directive that was repealed by the 2002 one. In this context, given the fact that the 2002 
Privacy Directive changed in the most part the content of the provisions referring to 
unsolicited commercial communications, it is questionable if the reference can still be 
considered valid. Taking into account the opposition to the current Privacy Directive in 
the business circles, as well as the incompatibility that would result from the application 
of both provisions, it is my opinion that the reference can no longer be seen as justified.  
The E-Commerce Directive does not address however the issue of the initial 
collection of the e-mail addresses by the marketers and does not distinguish further 
regarding the different types of business relations that the marketer and the targeted e-
mail address owner might be in. Although the references to “other requirements 
established by Community law”195 (additional to the E-commerce Directive provisions) 
cannot be ignored, still it is my opinion that some rules regarding the initial collection of 
the e-mail addresses should have been also included in a directive aiming to set up the 
general framework in which e-commerce activities are supposed to take place. These 
rules could have referred not to the issues pertaining more to personal data protection, but 
at least to the sources from where the collection of the e-mail addresses can occur. All the 
more reason to instantiate the rules for unsolicited commercial communications to the 
possible pre-existing relations between the service provider and the receiver: is the 
                                                 
195 Article 7(1), E-commerce Directive 
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receiver a customer already? Is it a visitor to the website, who provided the e-mail 
address just in order to take part in a competition? Is he simply an Internet user with 
whom the marketer had no previous contact? Of course, all of them are granted the 
general right to opt-out to receiving commercial communications, however such an 
instantiation would still provide useful guidance to the marketers as to how to behave in 
order not to be associated with a spammer 
From the point of view of the content, the E-Commerce Directive does not 
include even a general obligation for the marketers to personalise the content of the 
commercial e-mails sent according to the receiver’s profile, although such a distinction is 
claimed196 to exist between the legitimate direct marketing and spam. 
These minuses are partially covered by the 2002 Privacy Directive, at least at 
the level of express provisions, still the role they accomplish and the values they serve are 
different from the ones likely to be found in an E-commerce Directive (I consider here 
the different interests and values safeguarded by the two texts, as presented above). 
The 2002 Privacy Directive introduces the notion of “informed, prior consent” 
of the receiver as the only factor legitimizing the sending of commercial e-mails. Even in 
a situation covered by the soft opt-in rule, the e-mail address was originally collected 
following a clear manifestation of consent from the part of the individual with rights to 
decide upon the kind of content that will subsequently fill in the Inbox (it can be the 
individual holder of the address, or the individual in charge with administering the 
contact address of a legal person) .Therefore as opposed to the E-Commerce Directive, an  
e-mail marketer risks being labelled as a spammer from the first message sent without a 
clear manifestation of consent197, and not at a later point when it overlooks the wishes of 
an end-user.  
The 2002 Privacy Directive also changes the manner in which the natural 
persons can object to and stop further commercial e-mails as well as the actors involved. 
In the E-Commerce Directive, it was the Member State’s obligation to set up easily 
accessible registries in which the natural persons could register their objection. The 
marketers had only to make sure they check them “regularly”. According to the rules in 
                                                 
196 see the ICC Code of Conduct 
197 clearly a point found objectionable by the majority of marketers 
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the 2002 Privacy Directive the objection is to be sent directly to the marketer (through 
unsubscribe links) and has to be handled by the marketer himself.  
Last but not least, it is unclear how the Privacy Directive envisages the 
functioning of an opt-out registry for legal persons and what rules would apply regarding 
timeliness of the recordings, the authority of the mother company to decide over the 
commercial e-mails received by the daughter company or the situation of the business 
entities lacking legal personality.  
To sum up and answer the question in the title of this subsection, I find little 
grounds to consider the provisions in the two directives as representing one legislative 
solution in the fight against spam, but rather as being two separate parts of a legal 
framework that is supposedly in place to deal with spam. Either we consider that the 
provisions of article 7of the E-commerce directive have been implicitly and partially 
abrogated by the enactment of the 2002 Privacy Directive198, and they remain in force 
only in what regards the legal persons199, or they are both in force and refer however to 
different business practices200. E-commerce Directive refers to commercial 
communications in general in article 6 and 7 to unsolicited commercial communications 
that are part of a marketer’s practice, but without having the features usually associated 
with spam, while the 2002 Privacy Directive is a regulation designed to address spam 
issues. I will argue the latter point in Subsection 2.  
 
Subsection 2  Fitness for the purpose 
Up until now Europe does not have a special law dealing especially with the 
spam issue. Although the negative effects of spam have been stated on numerous 
occasions by the European officials, the topic is still addressed mainly by the two 
directives analysed in this thesis. There are legitimate grounds to believe that the 
provisions in article 7 of the E-commerce Directive, as much as they contain divergent 
                                                 
198 this idea seems to be conveyed by the First Report on the Application of the E-Commerce Directive 
(COM(2003) 702 final) which  states that “the issue of unsolicited commercial communications via e-mail 
has now been dealt with at Community level by Directive 2002/58/EC” (section 4.3) 
199 see Recital 45 of the 2002 Privacy Directive 
200. Surprisingly, the idea is conveyed by the same document mentioned in footnote 198 (COM(2003) 702 
final), stating that the issue of unsolicited commercial communications is being dealt with now by the 2002 
Privacy Directive, as this issue has “increasingly become a problem for consumers and business alike” , see 
page 10. 
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points from the 2002 Privacy Directive, are still in force and a relevant piece of the 
framework. First of all, although the 2002 Privacy Directive repeals expressly Directive 
97/66/EC, it refers to the provisions of article 7 of the E-Commerce Directive without 
questioning their validity. Secondly, international fore 201 treats the E-Commerce 
provisions as a piece of the European anti-spam answer Other reasons relate more to the 
circumstances in which the Directive was enacted. Gauthronet and Drouard (2001)202 
argue that the European anti-spam legislation was “a reaction to American privacy 
issues” and “the relevant law was in place before the phenomenon ever emerged in 
Europe”, while “the research conducted for this study reveal  that Europe has not yet 
experienced an acute outbreak of unsolicited commercial e-mail or of spam”. If this is the 
case, the provisions in E-commerce Directive can be seen as a general framework203 
stating the expected behaviour of all the marketers that do send unsolicited commercial 
communications and not a spam targeted norm per se. On the other hand, article 13 of the 
2002 Privacy Directive is seen as a “victory” in the fight against spam204.  
 It is this “victory” that I question.  
Without doubt, the opt-in regime introduced by the 2002 Privacy Directive 
changed some of the provisions of the Directive 97/66/EC that proved inefficient in the 
fight against spam. It attempted and partially succeeded in unifying the legal regime 
applicable all throughout Europe bringing a plus of legal certainty. Previously, through 
making use of their autonomy to chose either an opt-in or an opt-out205 regime for 
unsolicited communications206, the Member States fragmented the unity of the legal 
market failing to reach a common anti-spam approach. Therefore, the behaviour of the 
same marketer pursuing an e-mail marketing campaign and targeting e-mail holders 
without their prior consent, could have been regarded at the same time as spam in his 
                                                 
201 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/legislation_europeanunion.html. 
202 Gauthronet &Drouard, op.cit, at 82. 
203 See Recital (10) stating “In accordance with the principle of proportionality, the measures provided for 
in this Directive are strictly limited to the minimum needed to achieve the objective of the proper 
functioning of the internal market…” 
204 “We Did It! EU Parliament "Opts In" Commercial Email in European Economic Area will not be 
allowed without recipients' prior consent, states the European Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial 
Email , http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/index.html (last visited 20 August 2005). It is relevant that the quoted 
source considers unsolicited commercial email (UCE) as being “more commonly known as "spam". 
205 See an overview of the option of the European countries between opt-in /opt-out regime in May 2002 at  
http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/lchaos.html (last visited 20 Aug. 05). 
206 According to article 12 of the Directive 97/66/EC. 
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own country (if that country implemented the opt-in regime) and a legitimate marketer in 
countries that implemented an opt-out regime. Additional difficulties were raised by the 
impossibility to link sometimes the e-mail address to a certain country and by the difficult 
detection of the right opt-out register to check. 
At the same time, the newly introduced opt-in regime addressed the issue of the 
initial collection of the e-mail addresses, one of the problems commonly associated with 
spam. The previous opt-out regime legitimised the sending of the first commercial e-mail. 
It represented a weak defence against spam, as the  commercial e-mail, once sent and 
received by the end-user, rarely allowed for subsequent removal (and the activation of the 
unsubscribe link, if present, did nothing more than confirming the address as valid, thus 
leading to more spam). At the same time, the opt-out regime placed additional burden on 
the end-user, making him responsible to stop the flooding of his address with unwanted 
mail (so he had to spend time and energy both in removing the existent unwanted content, 
and to take action to stop further messages). As the role of the end-user changed 
following the introduction of the opt-in regime (he is now the initiator of the commercial 
dialogue), it has become arguably easier to set the anti-spam filters to let in only the 
content that was expressly and knowingly agreed by the user. The opt-in targets also the 
uselessness of the spam messages. It is improbable that the user will give his prior and 
informed consent to something that he might later on claim as useless, and in any event, a 
legitimate marketer, as opposed to a spammer, would have a defence and a justification 
for having sent that particular content to that particular e-mail address, through stating the 
circumstances in which the consent was asked and received.  
By changing the procedure through which the end-user manifests his will not to 
receive further commercial e-mails and relying not a third administrative party but the 
two parties involved (the sender and the receiver), the provisions in article 13 created a 
standard requirement for the inclusion of a workable opt-out link207, considering that 
most spam messages do not allow the receiver to refuse receiving the spam e-mails. Of 
course, a good point regarding the prohibition of disguised or concealed sender identity 
was maintained in the intention to outlaw the practice used by spammers to hide their 
                                                 
207 as reflected in the existing FEDMA and ICC Codes of Conduct. 
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tracks either by using a third party e-mail address as an alleged sender address or to use a 
fake address and abandon it immediately after.  
The most important critique that can be brought to the current anti-spam legal 
provisions is that they attempt to treat two separate activities as being one and the same. 
The definitional inconsistency called for the compromise solution of the soft opt-in as a 
way to alleviate the concerns of direct marketers regarding regulatory overkill.  In my 
opinion, a clear definition of both terms (“commercial communication” and “direct 
marketing”) would have been of increased importance, especially since official 
documents use the term “spam” as being synonym with “unsolicited commercial 
electronic mail”208 with reference to article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive209, but 
attention, documents issued before and after 2002, by the marketing associations set clear 
parameters distinguishing the two activities210. In this context it seems misguided to 
borrow the terminology from one context and try to fit it into another while changing the 
scope of the activities comprised therein.  
The effect of this inconsistency of approach is best reflected in the different 
regime applicable to the commercial e-mails sent to legal persons. An approach 
consistent with the stated synonymy between spam and unsolicited commercial 
communications would have justified one single regime for both natural and legal 
persons. Several reasons concur to my opinion: 
While the difference in regime between business-to-business and business-to-
consumer relations if well founded in general211, businesses and consumers alike suffer 
the negative consequences of spam, and the legal personality is absolutely irrelevant from 
the spammers’ point of view. The definition of spam does not relate the spam features 
with the legal personality of the potential receiver. Therefore, an opt-in regime for legal 
persons would have condemned the spam in general as business practice and as illegal 
personal data processing no matter to whom the e-mail addresses belongs, considering 
                                                 
208 see the introductory chapter of this thesis. 
209 COM(2004) 28 final. 
210 See the final comments in the introductory Chapter of this thesis, especially footnotes 21 and 22. 
211 Being a reflection of the more general principles of equity and the protection of the contractual weaker 
party. 
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the overall detrimental effect212 and not associate it solely to the “distress” caused to the 
individuals.  
It is unlikely that a business will consider a CV sent by a private person without 
previous solicitation to be spam. It is even more unlikely that a newcomer on the market, 
sending information about the products and services it offers to all of the parties that he 
considers possibly interested, will be seen as a spammer and it is unlikely that he will 
continue to send e-mails to the same business that already rejected his proposal (that 
would not be in the interest of a good public image). But as previously analysed, spam is 
not about this king of messages.  
 Since the European legislator did not provide a clear distinction between e-mail 
marketing involving also unsolicited commercial communications and spam, using 
instead the etiquette neuter terms consecrated by the business practice and literature, 
special cautions were required in order not to short-circuit legitimate communications 
that are intrinsic to the e-commerce practice. 
To sum up, the European anti spam solution seems to be, for the most part, an 
appropriate tool against spam as it tackles some of the most important features of the 
commercial communications that can be regarded as spam. However, the definitional 
issues and the inconsistency regarding the level of protection for legal persons cannot be 
overlooked. Some of the negative consequences of the above mentioned minuses and 
relevant issues that have been disregarded by the European legislator will be addressed in 
the following section. 
 
Subsection 3  Negative consequences? 
One of the negative points regarding the European anti-spam legislative tool is 
that its constituent provisions are scattered throughout various Directives whose 
applicability is called by unclear references. SUA, Japan, Australia to give just a few 
examples, have enacted special legislation to deal with the particular issues involved by 
spam. In Europe, however, it seems that general principles of data processing, 3 articles 
                                                 
212 “Spam has negative impacts for consumers, businesses, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), legitimate e-
mail marketers and virtually anyone else who uses e-mail for any reason ”, Cristina Bueti “ITU Survey on 
anti-spam legislation worldwide” (July 2005), available at: 
 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf  
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dealing with the unclearly defined notion of “unsolicited commercial communications” 
and several provisions dealing with consumer protection are supposed to provide the 
national enforcement authorities213 with sufficient legislative guidance in order to ensure 
an efficient fight against spam214. This option translates however in supplementary 
difficulties in identifying the relevant provisions as well as in finding the way they fit in a 
“Lego” like framework. 
In terms of content of the legal provisions, despite the numerous advantages of 
the opt-in rule, the inconsistency of approach with regard to the scope of unsolicited 
commercial communications leads to an overprotection for legitimate direct marketers 
and an reduced level of protection in the fight against spam. The need of a compromise 
required by the inclusion in the same term of two very distinct business practices is 
reflected in the need to discriminate between the regime applicable to natural and to legal 
persons (which does not reflect an existing difference in the practice of the spammers) 
and in the provisions referring to preexisting business relations (a framework preventing 
the marketers to abuse an existing customer relation is welcomed, but as empirical studies 
referred to in this thesis showed, customers don’t regard commercial e-mails coming 
from businesses to whom they previously dealt with as spam ). Although a broader 
discussion on the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, equating spam with the notion 
of “unsolicited commercial communications” indirectly legitimizes other types of spam, 
which are not commercial in nature.  
Due to article 4 of the Directive 95/46/EC, the provisions of the 2002 Privacy 
Directive (and therefore the opt-in rules) do not apply when the data controller is not 
established in a Member State or does not make use of equipment located in a Member 
State. Therefore, the solution found by the European legislator does little to protect the 
end-users from the spam coming from outside the European Union, which according to 
some studies215 accounts for the most part of spam (see Annex 3). 
                                                 
213 either courts, or administrative bodies such as consumer protection authorities or data protection units 
(see the Anti-Spam Law Enforcement Report (May 2005) , OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/43/34886680.pdf ( last visited 21 August 2005) for a list of authorities 
with responsibilities for enforcement of laws related to spam ). 
214 I am not questioning the role of the codes of conduct, what is in focus now is the legislative answer. 
215 See for example ITU survey (2005), op.cit. 
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Although I can’t argue that the negative consequences presented above 
overweight the positive aspects, I see the European anti-spam legislation as more of a 
verbal declaration of war then as a machine-gun pointed at spammers and their activity. 
This statement does not overlook the role that the Member States themselves have in 
transposing the Directives and in making its provisions more concrete, but as long a the 
general framework is unclear and leaves room for interpretation, the overall result can’t 
be other than divergent national solutions and ultimately a fragmented approach. 
 
 
Section 4: Other legislative solutions. 
As a business practice that transcends all geographic and jurisdictional 
boundaries and as a “plague” on the Internet communications, spam is a worldwide 
challenge. Therefore, I consider appropriate to point out some216 of the main convergent 
and divergent attempts made worldwide in order to bring spam to a halt, through 
legislative measures. Ultimately, the efficiency of legislative measures supposed to bring 
it to a halt depends ultimately of the results of a common effort of harmonization between 
existing anti-spam laws. 
Most of the laws that try to deal with spam associate this notion with the term 
“unsolicited commercial communications”. The association is not surprising since spam 
has originally emerged like an advertising practice, and a large part of the spam messages 
are oriented towards promoting various products and services217.  Although some laws 
use the term “spam” in the title (see for example the American CAN-Spam Act(2003)218, 
or the Australian Spam Act(2003)219), their definition section addresses the meaning of 
commercial messages and the circumstances in which they are deemed to be 
                                                 
216 for a detailed comparative analysis of spam laws, see Derek E.Bambauer et.al., A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF SPAM LAWS: THE QUEST FOR A MODEL LAW (July 2005 ), available at  
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Comparative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.
pdf  (last visited 22 August 2005) 
217 see the definitions provided in the Introductory chapter of this thesis 
218 “Controlling the Assault of Non- Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 ”, USA, available at 
http://news.com.com/pdf/ne/2003/FINALSPAM.pdf (last visited 22 August 2005) 
219 “An Act about spam, and for related purposes” Australia (2003), available at 
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3628/top.htm (last visited 22 August 2005) 
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unsolicited220. However, there is no common approach whether spam equals unsolicited 
commercial communications in general (as it is the case in the European Directives) or 
apart from being unsolicited and commercial, spam messages infringe some other 
statutory provisions. The Japanese Law221 is to be noted in this context, since it defines 
“specified e-mail (spam)” as referring to “the action whereby e-mailers (limited to 
organizations looking to make a profit or individuals carrying out a business) send out 
emails advertising or promoting either their or someone else's business to people other 
than those who have agreed to receive these ”. Not only it contains an express reference 
to “spam” but it limits the range of possible senders to businesses. 
As previously shown in this thesis, the European Privacy Directive from 2002 
establishes different anti-spam rules when the targeted e-mail address belongs to a natural 
person as opposed to a legal person. I questioned the opportunity of this dichotomy in the 
context of spam throughout this Chapter. In fact, the solution is not embraced by any of 
the non-European laws examined. The CAN-Spam act refers to the “recipient” of the 
unsolicited e-mails as being the “authorized user of the electronic mail address to which 
the message was sent or delivered”. Similarly, the Australian Act defines the notion of 
“consent” 222 by referring to the manifestation of will of “the individual or organization 
concerned”. Other laws223 are not referring at all to the potential receiver of the spam 
messages, dealing exclusively with those involved in the illegal collection of the e-mails 
and those using the e-mails thus collected for direct marketing purposes.  
According to the study done by Bambauer (2005)224, there are no standard rules 
establishing the permitted sources from which the e-mail addresses can be collected. The 
country that is nowadays responsible for the most spam, the United States, prohibits225 
address harvesting from Internet websites or proprietary online services only when such 
collection contravenes to a stated declaration that such website or online service “will not 
give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses maintained by such website or online service to 
                                                 
220  see Section 3 (2)a of the American act defining the term “commercial electronic mail message” and 
section 6(1) of the Australian act defining the meaning of commercial electronic messages 
221 “Law on Regulation of transmission of Specified Electronic Mail(2004), 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho_tsusin/eng/Releases/Telecommunications/news041227_8.html   
222 see Schedule 2 of the Australian Act 
223 links to several anti-spam laws are provided at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/law.html . 
224 Derek E.Bambauer, op cit. 
225 Section 5 (b)(1) of the CAN-Spam Act 
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any other party for the purposes of initiating, or enabling others to initiate, electronic mail 
messages”. The same idea is present also in the S-Korean Law from 2001226. Moreover, 
the Argentinean Law from 2000227 states that the consent of the data subject is not 
necessary when the personal data (including the e-mail address) was collected from 
publicly available websites. On the other hand, while the European Union legislation 
makes no reference to the prohibition of the production, use, making available of 
software tools that can be used in order to generate addresses (what is referred to as 
dictionary attacks), several other legislations outlaw expressly this practice. Section 
5(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the CAN-Spam Act prohibits the initiation of transmissions to addresses 
that were obtained through “combining names, letters, or numbers into numerous 
permutations”. Section 16 (6) of the Australian Act prohibits the “sending of commercial 
electronic message to a non-existent electronic address”. Similarly, article 50 (6) of the S-
Korean Law prohibits the use of “programs and other technical devices which make it 
possible to automatically identify contact information of receivers such as phone 
numbers, e-mail addresses, addresses, etc. through the combination of numbers, codes 
and letters”.  
Although some differences might be emphasized in this regard as well228, the 
countries that have enacted anti-spam legislations agree on the importance of prohibiting 
the use of false header information in all commercial communications. This includes the 
prohibition of false sender addresses, false or misleading return addresses and most 
importantly false subject lines. Similarly, giving the end-user the possibility to object at 
any point to further commercial communications and honoring this option has become a 
standard requirement in the anti-spam laws.229  
                                                 
226 Act on Promotion of Information and Communication and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection of 2001, available at:  
http://www.mic.go.kr/eng/res/res_pub_db/res_pub_mic_wp/2003/whitepaper2003/in3_7_5.htm, section 50-
2 (1) 
227  Personal Data Protection Act (2000), available at  
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/64790/norma.htm, see article 5(2)(a) . 
228 for example, some countries request not only that the subject line is not misleading, but impose also a 
labeling requirement for the easy identification of the commercial messages: South Korea uses “@”, the 
United States and Singapore have proposed “ADV”.  
229 However, different requirements are formulated regarding the unsubscribe function and the ways in 
which the end-users might communicate their will to the marketer. Australia compels the senders to 
provide the opt-out function through the same technology that was used to convey the commercial 
message. US require that the opt-out mechanism that was offered to the receiver remain usable for at least 
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If some of these provisions might be easily reconciled in a harmonization 
initiative aimed at achieving an effective enforcement, the key factor on which the States 
are still far from reaching an agreement is whether or not the prior consent of the 
legitimate e-mail address holder is required, as well as on the desired quality of the 
consent. Among the states that are considered nowadays to be on the top 10 list of spam 
senders, US, S-Korea, Japan, Argentina and Hong Kong have an opt-out regime. Russia 
and China do not have yet anti-spam rules, although in the first case, the drafting of anti 
spam laws with an opt-in approach has been initiated230. Canada231 has an opt-in regime, 
since article 7 of the PIPEDA Act of 2000 states expressly the circumstances where the 
collection of the personal data can be done without the consent of the data subject, and 
the direct marketing purposes are not within the scope of these exceptions. Australia and 
the European Union have adopted also an opt-in approach. However, the meaning of 
consent in the two legislations is dissimilar in an essential way: while the European 
Union requires a “prior, express and informed consent” of the e-mail address owner, 
Schedule 2 of the Australian Act permits both the express and the “reasonably inferred 
consent” of the individual or the organization concerned. The consent can be inferred by 
examining both the conduct of the parties in the particular case and the existing business 
or other relations between them.  
There is a reduced likelihood that a compromise solution can be found: either 
the first commercial e-mail is permitted and the end-user is given the option to stop the 
commercial e-mails, or it is prohibited to send commercial e-mails without the user’s 
prior consent.   
“While a model law could allow adopting states to make their own 
decision on this element, doing so would weaken consistency and 
enforcement since messages sent from an opt-out regime would not 
(absent a reciprocal enforcement agreement) constitute an offense, 
even if sent to a recipient in an opt-in jurisdiction. Any anti-spam 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 days after the commercial message was sent. Similarly, S-Korea prohibits the marketer to take 
“technical measures with the aim of evading or obstructing the rejection of receiving such advertisement 
information by receivers”. 
230 The project started in 2003 at the initiative of the UNESCO IFAP (Information for All Programme) 
National Committee of Russia, see http://www.ifap.ru/eng/projects/antispam.htm for details. 
231  See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/p-8.6/93196.html ,   
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regime with an opt-in system at its core is almost certain to be a more 
aggressive anti-spam regime than an opt-out system. This divide in 
existing provisions will constitute a major issue with which 
harmonization must contend”232.  
The above comparison highlighted somehow surprisingly that the great majority 
of the countries that are among the first 10 world spammers do have detailed provisions 
outlawing the activities commonly associated with spam. Therefore their partial 
ineffectiveness in stopping the continuous flooding of e-mail addresses has to be 
associated with other factors then a regulatory black hole.  One might thus wonder about 
the role that the legislation alone can be expected to play in the fight against spam.  
  
 
 
                                                 
232 Derek E.Bambauer(2005), op.cit, page 17 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Regulators must consider how their traditional laws interact with other 
 modes of governing behavior, including the use of technological restrictions 
 implemented through software code, economic incentives via market mechanisms, 
 and social controls brought to bear through norms”.233
 
This thesis aimed at analyzing the anti-spam European provisions by examining 
the manner in which they respond to the spam anomaly. Instead of choosing to fragment 
the normative text into easily definable concepts, my goal was to look at spam in the 
business context in which it occurs. That required first of all to clearly identify the 
investigated business practice and to point out similarities and discrepancies between this 
advertising practice and other, related ones. All business practices are the result of an 
opportunity and survive only if they are mutually beneficial for the business party and for 
the potential customer. Therefore, Chapter 1 started by stressing the existing opportunity 
that marketers have in collecting, using and commercializing personal information, 
largely available from different sources, at virtually no cost. It subsequently discussed the 
crucial issue of the personal data character of the e-mail address. Chapter 1 highlighted in 
its final part the ethical and behavioural differences between the legitimate e-mail 
practices and spam. 
The conclusions reached in the first chapter, especially those related to the 
personal data character of the e-mail addresses are used in Chapter 2 as premises for a 
discussion about values and about the potential conflicts that might arise in the attempt to 
find a balance between potentially conflicting interests of the actors involved (end-users 
and direct marketers). Most importantly, this chapter identifies and arguments the 
difference in focus between the two main legal instruments analyzed and the different 
weight awarded by the European legislator, through these legal provisions, to the 
economic interest of the marketer, on one side, and the privacy and associated interests of 
the end-users, on the other. 
                                                 
233 Derek E.Bambauer, op.cit, page 15 
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 The evaluation of the efficiency and the effectiveness of the European anti-
spam legislation, which is the focus of Chapter 3, takes into account three elements: the 
business practices that are commonly associated with spam, as a factual argument, the 
interests of the actors involved, that generates the dynamic of the relations established 
between direct marketers and potential receivers of the commercial messages as well as 
the reflection of these two elements in the legal provisions of the E-Commerce Directive 
and the 2002 Privacy Directive. Therefore, the conclusion reached is not based only on a 
limited legal text dissection, but includes arguments relating to social psychology, 
marketing, economic theory.  
Using this method I managed to identify several impediments that prevent the 
European response to spam to become an appropriate tool to be used in annihilating 
spam. They relate to definitional inconsistencies, to clashes between legal texts equally 
applicable, to differences in regime not justified by the practices involved in spam and to 
the insufficient level of protection for the legal persons that become victim of this 
unethical, unfair and generally detrimental business practice. 
De lege ferenda, the anti-spam normative solution could benefit from an explicit 
and coherent definition of the two different business practices: e-mail marketing and 
spam, and I believe the European legislator should not refrain from “calling things for 
what they are”, instead of using the unclear term of “unsolicited commercial 
communications”.  
At the same time, if the provisions of both E-Commerce Directive (art.6 and 7) 
and 2002 Privacy Directive (art.13) are to be considered in force, than it should be made 
more clear that they address different business realities. Several arguments have been 
presented in Chapter 3 in order to justify that article 13 of the 2002 Privacy Directive is a 
norm designed to address spam, whereas the E—Commerce Directive ones may only be 
seen as a general framework setting the rules for the unsolicited commercial 
communications that cannot be qualified as spam. Therefore, the soft opt-in rule would 
be better placed in the E-Commerce Directive than in the 2000 Privacy Directive, as 
spam appears only exceptionally in already existing businesses relations. Moreover, the 
privacy legislation in general does not instantiate different principles and levels of 
protection based on the existence of a business relation between data subject and the data 
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controller. The result achieved by the inclusion of this rule in the legal text establishing a 
general framework for the unsolicited commercial communications would send a signal 
to the e-mail marketers that they cannot abuse existing business relations and would 
make sure that the customer has a viable alternative to the aggressive practice of the 
spammers.  
Similarly, unifying the legal anti-spam provisions applicable to both natural and 
legal persons would first of all reflect better the business reality that spam does not 
discern between the e-mail addresses of the individuals and those of businesses, and 
secondly would relate the banning of spam not only to the emotional distress caused to 
the individuals but to the overall costs and negative consequences that impinge on the 
Internet communications in general. 
I do believe that legislation is a powerful mechanism and a guarantee that non-
pecuniary values such as equity, autonomy, privacy, non-discrimination are protected. In 
fact, since data protection in itself, separate from the right to privacy is starting to be 
recognized in Europe as a basic human right234, the argument that “spammers don’t care 
about the law anyway” should be accepted with care. I can see several reasons why the 
market should not be permitted to set alone the “price” of personal information, absent all 
regulatory constraints. First of all, there will always be an information asymmetry 
between customers and marketers, which will prevent the formers to perceive the real 
level of privacy intrusion made possible by the current technology as well all the uses to 
which different pieces of personal information could be put – rational factors that can 
contribute to identifying the true value of the personal data disclosed. Secondly, privacy 
is threatened by the aggregated effect of small violations, therefore the privacy 
preferences of the individual might be different for a particular intrusion and for privacy 
as a whole. Thirdly, most individuals view privacy as a long term, abstract gain, whereas 
the benefit resulted from personal data disclosure is usually tangible and immediate. This 
again prevents an equitable remuneration for the disclosure, and only an illusion of 
informational self determination.   
                                                 
234 see for example the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted 7.12.2000 (OJ 
C364, 18.12.2000 p.1 )  in article 8 and  also art I-51 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(providing a right to protection of personal data) 
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Quite normally, the legislation is only part and parcel of a broader range of 
measures targeted against spam. Co-regulation, the use of self-regulatory mechanisms in 
order to translate the general normative rules into more detailed codes of conduct,  may 
respond better to the complexities of spam then if only laws would be relied on. 
However, even the most detailed rules of conduct cannot supplement the pro-active 
involvement of the end-user himself. No one would argue that being a part of the “off-
line” society means learning a series of preventive conducts and not relying only on laws 
guaranteeing the protection from various wrongs caused by the others. Similarly, actions 
aimed at raising awareness about the threats and the reasonable behaviour when 
exploring the “on-line world” can only be in the interest of the users. This is probably 
where future efforts of the international and national bodies alike should be directed more 
in the future, especially considering the increasing number of Internet users worldwide. 
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Source: MessageLabs  ,  taken from the “ITU SURVEY ON ANTI-SPAM LEGISLATION WORLDWIDE 2005, available at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf” 
Annex 1  Percentage of worldwide internet  e-mail identified as spam 
  
 
Annex 2 E-mail spam examples: 
 
 
 
Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2005 00:56:26 +0500 
From:  "Lynn Willis" <bthnnggvsejagb@yahoo.com>  Add to Address Book
To:  dancointl@yahoo.com 
Subject: Re [11]: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 1: False header information 
 
 
 II
 III
 
 
Date: Mon, 04 Jul 2005 07:24:41 -0500 
From: "Steve Dauman P.manager" <seabird@infinito.it>  Add to Address Book
To:  dancohen58@yahoo.com 
CC: 
 dancohn1@yahoo.com,  dancoi2000@yahoo.com,  dancointl@yahoo.com, 
dancoj2000@yahoo.com 
Subject: The unique possibility to increase your income. Protection code:GE-4177 
 
You are invited to work in  world-wide  
enterprise. 
 
Would You Rather Have 
Financial independence or Time Freedom? 
 
How about both? 
 
Everyday People Living Extraordinary Lives Their  
Very First Year! 
Your success will be achieved with personal  
mentoring by a group of 
individuals that have already achieved a multiple  
six-figure income. The 
system that is in place works perfectly. If you  
are not satisfied with 
unfairly low salary and ready to earn much more,  
YOU have come to the RIGHT 
place. ANYONE that is coachable and trainable  
will succeed. This opportunity 
requires no personal selling or explaining. Here  
are just a few of YOUR 
benefits. 
--[…] 
 
Example 2 : One form of dictionary attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: MessageLabs  ,  taken from the “ITU SURVEY ON ANTI-SPAM LEGISLATION WORLDWIDE 2005, available at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf” 
Annex 3  Top ten  spam countries 
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